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Freedom of Religion in India: Current Issues and 
Supreme Court Acting as Clergy  
Faizan Mustafa* and Jagteshwar Singh Sohi** 
Religion is an indispensable part of human existence. Freedom of 
religion is considered as the third most important civil liberty after the 
right to life and personal liberty and the freedom of speech and 
expression. The Indian Constitution guarantees freedom of religion and 
acknowledges the individual’s autonomy in his or her relationship with 
God. However, the Supreme Court of India, through the creation and 
continued use of the essentiality test, has tried to reform religion by 
restricting the scope of this freedom. The judiciary has taken over the 
role of clergy in determining what essential and non-essential religious 
practices are. Moreover, the Court has applied the test in an inconsistent 
manner, repeatedly changing the method of determining essentiality, 
seriously undermining religious liberty. This Article examines these 
judgments to demonstrate the adverse impact of the essentiality test on 
religious freedom. 
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I. THE CASE FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
Religion has been at the center of human societal existence since 
time immemorial.1 Though some scholarship claims certain tribes or 
civilizations existed without religion,2 it is not a well-accepted view.3 
Religion is, and has always been, an indispensable and ineffaceable 
 
 1. Cicero, the great Roman orator, stated as much when he claimed “there is no race 
so uncivilized, no one in the world . . . so barbarous that his mind has no inkling of a belief in 
gods . . . .” CICERO, TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS 37 (J.E. King trans., 1971).  This argument is 
known as consensus gentium, meaning “from consent,” and has been reproduced since that 
time in one form or another. See generally Walter H. O’Briant, Is There an Argument 
Consensus Gentium?, 18 INT’L J. FOR PHIL. RELIGION 73, 73 (1985) (discussing the rise and 
fall of the consensus gentium argument for the existence of God). 
 2. Whether there were human societies without any form of religion was an important 
question that gripped the European intelligentsia. As new lands were explored—between the 
sixteenth and nineteenth century—these debates were engaged in time and again. Today, there 
remain only a few proponents that argue cultures without religion exist. See generally S.N 
BALAGANGADHARA, ‘THE HEATHEN IN HIS BLINDNESS . . .’: ASIA, THE WEST AND THE 
DYNAMIC OF RELIGION (H.G. Kippenberg & E.T. Lawson eds., 1994); DANIEL DUBUISSON, 
THE WESTERN CONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION: MYTHS, KNOWLEDGE, AND IDEOLOGY 
(William Sayers trans., 2003) (1998); FRITS STAAL, RITUAL AND MANTRAS: RULES WITHOUT 
MEANINGS (1996). 
 3. Through the twentieth century, it has been generally accepted that all known 
cultures or societies have some kind of religion. See THOMAS FORD HOULT, THE SOCIOLOGY 
OF RELIGION 3 (1958) (“Wherever there is man there is religion. Manifestations of it are 
found universally.”); ALEXANDER LE ROY, THE RELIGION OF THE PRIMITIVES 286 (Newton 
Thompson trans., 1922) (“The first conclusion . . . is the fundamental universality, 
permanence, and identity of religions. This great fact is no longer disputed by any one . . . .”); 
JOSEP R. LLOBERA, AN INVITATION TO ANTHROPOLOGY: THE STRUCTURE, EVOLUTION AND 
CULTURAL IDENTITY OF HUMAN SOCIETIES 73 (2003) (“Religion . . . deals with supernatural 
beings from specific gods to vague forces . . . . [T]here is little doubt that religion is universal 
and that . . . it has existed in all societies for at least 40,000 years.”); BRIAN MORRIS, 
ANTHROPOLOGICAL STUDIES OF RELIGION: AN INTRODUCTORY TEXT 1 (1987) (“Few would 
deny that some form of religion is universal among mankind.”); ELIZABETH K. NOTTINGHAM, 
RELIGION AND SOCIETY 1 (1954) (“[Sociologists are] interested in religion as a universal 
function of human societies wherever they may be found.”); JOHN A. SALIBA, ‘HOMO 
RELIGIOSUS’ IN MIRCEA ELIADE: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL EVALUATION 22 (1976) 
(“[R]eligion is a universal phenomenon . . . .”); ROBERT L. WINZELER, ANTHROPOLOGY AND 
RELIGION: WHAT WE KNOW, THINK, AND QUESTION 3–4 (2008) (examining the universality 
of religion). 
6.MUSTAFASOHI_FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/6/2018  4:58 PM 
915 Freedom of Religion in India 
 917 
part of our lives.4 This tenant is especially evident in Indian culture. 
Man is incurably religious; but Indians most of all.5 
Indian society “displays a[] . . . manifest tendency towards an 
outlook that is predominantly religious.”6 Sir Harcourt Butler, in 
often quoted words, noted that “[t]he Indians are essentially 
religious as Europeans are essentially secular. Religion is still the 
alpha, and the omega of Indian life.”7 The effect that religion has 
had on the progress of Indian society is tremendous.8 Therefore, the 
emergence of India as a secular state in the mid-twentieth century 
was a remarkable social, political, and religious phenomenon.9 
 
 4. Today, the scholarship in this regard gives an evolutionary-biological explanation of 
religion. See generally SCOTT ATRAN, IN GODS WE TRUST: THE EVOLUTIONARY LANDSCAPE 
OF RELIGION (2002); PASCAL BOYER, RELIGION EXPLAINED: THE EVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS 
OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT (2001); MATT J. ROSSANO, SUPERNATURAL SELECTION: HOW 
RELIGION EVOLVED (2010); DAVID SLOAN WILSON, DARWIN’S CATHEDRAL: EVOLUTION, 
RELIGION, AND THE NATURE OF SOCIETY (2002). 
 5. See T.N. Madan, Religion in India, 118 DAEDALUS 114, 115–17 (1989) (discussing 
the central position religion holds in the cultures, traditions, and people of India). 
 6. ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE, A STUDY OF HISTORY 242 (D.C. Somervell ed., 1947). 
 7. RAJENDRA K. SHARMA, INDIAN SOCIETY, INSTITUTIONS AND CHANGE 186 (2004) 
(quoting SPENCER HARCOURT BUTLER, INDIA INSISTENT (1931)). 
 8. See Faizan Mustafa, Freedom of Religion in India: Contemporary Challenges, 
CENTRE FOR STUDY OF SOCIETY AND SECULARISM (May 14, 2015), http://www.csss-
isla.com/4th-aae-memorial-lecture-full-text/. 
 9. In the original 1950 Constitution, as instituted by the people, Articles 25–28 
established the “Right to Freedom of Religion.” INDIA CONST. art. 25–28. These rights were 
in Part III, which reflected the Fundamental Rights provided by the document. Id. These were 
enforceable against the State, and have, rightly, been referred to as the most important 
segment of the Constitution. This was further reinforced by the Constitution Act, 1976; 
section two of the Constitution Act added the word ‘“secular’” to the Preamble of the 
constitution, with effect on January 3, 1977. See The Constitution (Forty-second 
Amendment) Act, 1976, No. 91, Acts of Parliament, 1976 (India), https://india.gov.in/my-
government/constitution-india/amendments/constitution-india-forty-second-amendment-act
-1976. Prior to this, in 1973, the Indian Supreme Court held in Keshavananda Bharti v. State 
of Kerala, Writ. Pet. No. 135 of 1970 (India Apr. 24, 1973), that secularism is part of the 
basic structure of the Constitution. Id. § 307. Thus, the amendment simply made explicit what 
was already implicit. See Faizan Mustafa, BJP & Secularism, THE STATESMAN (Dec. 4, 
2015,  8:18 PM), http://www.thestatesman.com/opinion/bjp-amp-secularism-108501.html 
(discussing the secularism debate surrounding the writing of the original Constitution). The 
present government’s Home Minister has asserted that secularism is the most abused word 
in  India, and means only panthnirpekshta (denominational neutrality) and not 
dharamnirpekhshata (religious neutrality). It seems that the Minister just wanted to give 
freedom to different sects or denominations under secularism rather than neutrality of the 
State in religious matters. This is a strange interpretation of secular polity as it merely refers to 
freedom within religions and tells us nothing about state-religion relationship. See id. 
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Though religion remains important in India, and still exists in the 
public sphere, the country has successfully retained its secular 
character.10 Secularism became ideal in religious India due to 
communalism because the former was understood as an answer to 
the latter.11 To make secularism acceptable, freedom of religion 
was  guaranteed.12 
This was made possible, in large part, because the framers of the 
Indian Constitution (the “Constitution”) wanted to base society on 
an understanding that man has an “inward association” with 
religion.13 It helped that the most conspicuous characteristic of 
Indian culture was the life of the inner spirit,14 meaning that it wasn’t 
any one religion per se that drove the Indian people, but a spiritual 
connection to a higher power.15 The concept of sarva dharma 
sambhava, the idea that all religions are true, also furthered this 
 
 10. See Ranbir Singh & Karamvir Singh, Secularism in India: Challenges and Its Future, 
69 INDIAN J. POL. SCI. 597, 603 (2008). 
 11. See id. at 599. Communalism is the belief that because a group of people follows a 
particular religion, they have, as a result, common social, political, and economic interests. 
Inherent herein is that the social, cultural, economic, and political interests of different 
religious groups are dissimilar and divergent. See BIPAN CHANDRA, COMMUNALISM IN 
MODERN INDIA 15–17 (1984). Another commentator notes that “[c]ommunal ideology 
perceives Indian society as constituted of a number of religious communities and the identity 
of Indian society is seen essentially in these terms. Attempts are also made to see the reality of 
Indian politics in terms of such religious communities.” Romila Thapar, Communalism and the 
Historical Legacy: Some Facets, 18 SOC. SCIENTIST 4, 5 (1990). 
 12. See Singh & Singh, supra note 10, at 600. 
 13. See Ananya Mukherjee Reed, Religious Freedom Versus Gender Equity in 
Contemporary India: What Constitutions Can and Cannot Do, 25 ATLANTIS 42, 42 (2001). 
[T]he framers of India’s Constitution sought to shape an overarching Indian 
identity by adopting a “secular” state based on three principles of equality, 
neutrality, and liberty. According to the principle of equality, the state was to give no 
preference to one religion over another. The principle of neutrality demanded that 
the state did not interfere in religious affairs or organizations of religious 
communities. According to the principle of liberty, the state was to permit the 
practice of any religion, within the limits set by certain other basic rights, which the 
state is also required to protect. 
Id. at 43 (citation omitted). 
 14. See P.T Raju, Enquiry on Interrelations of Cultures: India’s Cultures and Its 
Problems, UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCI. AND CULTURAL ORG. 1, 31–32 (Oct. 25, 
1949), http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001550/155060eb.pdf (summarizing the 
ideas of spirituality and solidarity in relation to religion and culture in India). 
 15. See L. S. S. O’MALLEY, POPULAR HINDUISM: THE RELIGION OF THE MASSES 45 
(Weston La Barre ed., Johnson Reprint Corp., 1970) (1935) (“Intellectual Indians . . . assert 
that the outlook on, and conduct of, life are not merely religious but spiritual.”). 
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spiritual connection, justifying tolerance and accommodation of 
distinctive religious identities.16 As such, the framers provided that 
no religion would be given preference over another and permitted 
the practice of any religion.17 Citizens would be free to follow and 
practice their religion in their private affairs, and thus, the State 
would not impose a uniform civil code despite a constitutional 
mandate to do so.18 Further, the State would not interfere in 
religious affairs so long as they did not affect certain other basic 
rights protected by the Constitution.19 Thus, one could say that the 
management of constitutional diversity in India went beyond 
creating a “melting pot”20 and genuinely provided for the 
preservation of distinctive identities.21 
 
 16. See Asghar Ali Engineer, Sacred and Secular: False Divide, 32 ECON. & POL. WKLY., 
Oct. 18, 1997, at 2653, 2653 (One emphasis in the debate over secularism is the idea that 
religion is the private affair of individuals, and all people should worship how they wish.). 
 17. See INDIA CONST. art. 25, § 1. 
 18. See id. 
 19. See id. (“Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of 
this Part . . . .”). 
 20. The melting pot is a model of ethnic relations in which a nation-state’s constituent 
ethnic groups engage in a process of reciprocal fusion. See ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF NATIONALISM 
177 (Athena S. Leoussi ed., 2001). It may be understood as assimilation, a process in which 
formerly distinct and separate groups come to share a common culture and merge together 
socially. See JOSEPH F. HEALEY, DIVERSITY AND SOCIETY: RACE, ETHNICITY, AND GENDER 44 
(4th ed. 2014). India, on the other hand, has followed pluralism, meaning the groups maintain 
their individual identities. See T.M.A.Pai Foundation & Ors v. State Of Karnataka & Ors, 
(2002) 8 SCC 481 (India). In a pluralistic society, groups remain separate, and their cultural 
and social differences persist over time. But see ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE 
HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1996); PETER BRIMELOW, 
ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE ABOUT AMERICA’S IMMIGRATION DISASTER (1995); 
MICHAEL NOVAK, THE RISE OF THE UNMELTABLE ETHNICS: POLITICS AND CULTURE IN THE 
SEVENTIES (1972), for criticisms of the former being an abstract cultureless society. 
 21. See INDIA CONST. art. 29–30; see also GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN, THE WHEEL OF 
LAW: INDIA’S SECULARISM IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 286 (2003). The 
author argues that American assimilative secularism would benefit by drawing from the Indian 
model the possibility of making the central religious practices of marginal social groups exempt 
from some of the laws applied to other citizens (i.e., allowing for preservation of distinctive 
identities). Id. at 283–84. He notes that secularism in India, which he calls positive secularism, 
is “a central component of a shared political identity that respects India’s various group 
identities and the State’s ameliorative project.” Id. at 286. For more on this point, see 
Anupama Roy, Constitutional and Legal Ensemble: Anti-Discrimination and Differentiated 
Universals of Citizenship, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF GENDER IN SOUTH ASIA 62, 62–65 
(Leela Fernandes ed., 2014). 
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Religious freedom, and its value, was understood in free India22 
from the very beginning.23 Gandhi was convinced that genuine 
religion—which for him was a personal affair24—in its true, complete, 
and virtuous form, constructs bridges of solidarity between people.25 
In a country ravaged by partition and a society emaciated by 
untouchability, the framers hoped that liberty of belief, faith, and 
worship would bring about equality and promote fraternity.26 
Religious freedom—freedom to follow, introspect, and investigate—
should allow one to authentically be religious. And this should create 
harmony and understanding, not propagate sectarianism.27 
 
 22. Referring to post-colonial India. 
 23. See 10 CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES, 448 (2003) (Shri Brajeshwar Prasad 
speaking about including secularism in the Constitution); AIJAZ AHMAD, LINEAGES OF THE 
PRESENT: POLITICAL ESSAYS 313 (1996) (noting that the assembly was of the view that a 
secular state was inevitable for the foundation of a liberal democracy in the country). 
 24. This ties in with the inward association narrative spoken of above that was adopted 
in the form of religious freedom in the Indian Constitution. See supra note 13 and 
accompanying text. Gandhi stated that “[r]eligion is a matter of the heart. It is between a man 
and his God.” MAHATMA GANDHI, 97 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF MAHATMA GANDHI 74–
75 (1999) (ebook), http://www.gandhiashramsevagram.org/gandhi-literature/mahatma-
gandhi-collected-works-volume-97.pdf [hereinafter GANDHI, THE COLLECTED WORKS]. 
Many such quotations may be found in the publication cited, but for further documentation, 
see also C.F. ANDREWS, MAHATMA GANDHI’S IDEAS: INCLUDING SELECTIONS FROM HIS 
WRITINGS (1949); 1 D.G. TENDULKAR, MAHATMA: LIFE OF MOHANDAS KARAMCHAND 
GANDHI (new ed., rev. 1960). 
 25. Gandhi stated “religion does not mean sectarianism . . . . This religion transcends 
Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, etc. It does not supersede them. It harmonizes them and gives 
them reality.” MAHATMA GANDHI, ALL MEN ARE BROTHERS: AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL 
REFLECTIONS 54 (Krishna Kripalani ed., The Continuum Publ’g Corp. 1980) (1958). In 
speaking of religion bringing us together, he is not referring to it as distinct socio-cultural 
entities. Rather, he refers to religion as the singular, contrasted with irreligion. See id. 
 26. See JUSTICE R.C. LAHOTI, PREAMBLE: THE SPIRIT AND BACKBONE OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 10–11 (Rohan Thawani ed., 2004) (discussing the importance of 
belief in ensuring liberty); SACHCHIDANANDA, SOCIAL CHANGE IN VILLAGE INDIA 3–4 
(1988) (examining the influence of liberty of belief and worship on establishing a 
democratic  society). 
 27. See generally HANS KÜNG, ISLAM: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE (John Bowden 
trans., 2007). “No peace among the nations without peace among the religions. No peace 
among the religions without dialogue between the religions. No dialogue between the 
religions without investigation of the foundations of the religions.” Id. at xxiii. In a speech 
made during his trip to Albania in 2014, Pope Francis noted that, “[a]uthentic religion is a 
source of peace and not of violence[.]” Pope to Albania’s Faith Leaders: Religion Is Source of 
Peace, VATICAN RADIO (Sept. 21, 2014, 4:31 PM), http://en.radiovaticana.va/news/2014
/09/21/pope_to_albanias_faith_leaders_religion_is_source_of_peace/1107025. The Pontiff 
continued to explain that religious freedom cannot merely be a right “guaranteed solely by 
 
6.MUSTAFASOHI_FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/6/2018  4:58 PM 
915 Freedom of Religion in India 
 921 
Religious freedom is premised on the belief that every human 
being has inherent dignity to explore his or her conscience and 
pursue the truth.28 Dr. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, former President of 
India and prominent member of the Indian Constituent Assembly, 
said that religion is a code of ethical rules and that the rituals, 
observances, ceremonies, and modes of worship are its outer 
manifestations.29 Religion also identifies with “feeling, emotion and 
sentiment, instinct, cult and ritual, perception, belief and faith.”30 
Professor Alfred North Whitehead defined religion as “what the 
individual does with his own solitariness.”31 Radhakrishnan argued 
that “[i]t is not true religion unless it ceases to be a traditional view 
and becomes personal experience.”32 Religious experience is a unique 
personal experience for most who seek it. “It is an independent 
functioning of the human mind, something unique, possessing an 
autonomous character.”33 In reality it is a relationship between the 
follower and his or her God. “It is something inward and personal, 
which unifies all values and organizes all experiences.”34 This spiritual 
aspect of religions has been lost in new religiosity, in which rituals 
have become far more important than the essence and larger purpose 
of religions. Form has become more prominent than substance.  
Unless one is able to interact with, interpret, and reinterpret his 
or her own religious sources, or shape and reshape his or her beliefs 
in light of changing social and political realities, progress can never 
 
existing legislation,” and that it must be a “shared space . . . of respect and cooperation that 
must be built with everyone’s participation . . . .” Id. 
 28. John Milton, in AREOPAGITICA, argues that the freedom to acquire and spread 
religious knowledge is what leads us to the truth. See generally JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 
(Edward Arber ed., AMG Press, Inc. 1966) (1644). AREOPAGITICA is among history’s most 
influential and impassioned philosophical defenses of the principle of freedom of speech and 
expression, and is opposed to licensing and censorship. Milton offered several reasons why 
unlicensed printing would promote the discovery of truth. Id. One of these now familiar 
claims is that truth will prevail over falsehood in any free encounter. See JOHN H. GARVEY, 
WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? (1996). 
 29. S. RADHAKRISHNAN, AN IDEALIST VIEW OF LIFE 84–126 (2d ed. 1957). 
 30. Id. at 87. 
 31. ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, RELIGION IN THE MAKING: LOWELL LECTURES, 
1926, at 16 (1957). 
 32. RADHAKRISHNAN, supra note 29, at 88. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
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be made.35 As such, religious freedom is essential for religious 
reform. Without such organic progress, religions—and the societies 
they deeply affect—can become stunted.36 Thus, only greater 
freedom for religions and other identity-based groups can lead to 
social harmony.37 Repression, on the other hand, leads to violence.38 
Long before the framing of the Constitution in India, the 
American Founding Fathers showed an understanding of “the vital 
role that religion plays in a free society. Far from shielding the 
American people from religious influence, the Founding Fathers 
promoted freedom of religion and praised the benefits it brings to 
 
 35. Marc Gopin, Religion, Violence, and Conflict Resolution, 22 PEACE & CHANGE 
1,  1  (1997). 
 36. JAY NEWMAN, ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 159–60 (1991). 
  From what source can the impetus to religious reform arise? We might be 
tempted to assume that there are many possible sources, insofar as, at the present 
stage of the development of civilization, we take for granted that religion is but one 
of many facets of life on earth, and that while religious experience and culture 
influence other aspects of life and nature, they are in turn influenced by these other 
aspects of life and nature. But what besides religion can generate the values 
necessary for altering the conception of religion itself? Ultimately, only a form of 
experience and culture can generate values; however important natural events may 
be in shaping our values, they can do so by way of the medium of thought or 
consciousness. As important as politics and economics are, these also depend on the 
valuation generated through some form of experience and culture. What, then, are 
the forms of experience and culture to which we can trace the incentive to reform 
our conceptions of religion, our religious conceptions, and our religious 
institutions? The ones that come to mind are art, history, philosophy and science. 
But art, history, and science can only play this role insofar as they have been infused 
with some religious or philosophical vision or, alternatively, insofar as their products 
have been subjected to some religious or philosophical interpretation. That leaves 
two possible sources, philosophy and religion. Since philosophy is an 
epiphenomenon of religion, that is, a form of experience and culture that grew out 
of religion and eventually attained some degree of independence and distinctness in 
relation to its source, we can say that in a sense the impetus to religious reform can 
only come from religion itself. 
Id. (footnote call number omitted). 
 37. BRIAN J. GRIM & ROGER FINKE, THE PRICE OF FREEDOM DENIED: RELIGIOUS 
PERSECUTION AND CONFLICT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 2–4, 212–13 (2011). 
Though there are others who have pointed out, correctly, that some restrictions on religion are 
necessary—especially in today’s world to maintain order or preserve a peaceful religious 
homogeneity. Id. at 10. 
 38. See AMARTYA SEN, IDENTITY AND VIOLENCE: THE ILLUSION OF DESTINY (2006); 
Ellen Wiles, Headscarves, Human Rights, and Harmonious Multicultural Society: Implications 
of the French Ban for Interpretations of Equality, 41 L. & SOC’Y REV. 699, 732 (2007). 
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society.”39 George Washington articulated this in his farewell address 
to the nation: 
 Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political 
prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable supports. 
In vain would that man claim the tribute of patriotism who 
should labor to subvert these great pillars of human 
happiness—these firmest props of the duties of men and 
citizens. The mere politician, equally with the pious man, 
ought to respect and to cherish them. A volume could not 
trace all their connections with private and public felicity. Let 
it simply be asked, Where is the security for property, for 
reputation, for life, if the sense of religious obligation desert 
the oaths which are the instruments of investigation in courts 
of justice? And let us with caution indulge the supposition 
that morality can be maintained without religion. Whatever 
may be conceded to the influence of refined education on 
minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience both 
forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in 
exclusion of religious principle.40 
Since the last decade of the twentieth century, “considerable 
research has emerged that demonstrates the benefits of religious 
practice within society.”41 “Religious practice promotes the well-
 
 39. Patrick F. Fagan, Why Religion Matters Even More: The Impact of Religious Practice 
on Social Stability, BACKGROUNDER, no. 1992, 2006, at 1, http://www.heritage.org/res
earch/reports/2006/12/why-religion-matters-even-more-the-impact-of-religious-practice-on
-social-stability. “In 1639, a group of New England Puritans drafted a constitution affirming 
their faith in God and their intention to organize a Christian Nation.” FRANK LAMBERT, THE 
FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE PLACE OF RELIGION IN AMERICA 1 (2003). “[T]hose Puritan 
Fathers organized a Christian State.” Id. Moreover, citizenship . . . was directly tied to one’s 
religious faith.” Id. at 2. “One hundred and fifty years later, . . . unlike the work of the Puritan 
Fathers, the federal constitution made no reference whatever to God or divine providence, 
citing as its sole authority ‘the people of the United States.’” Id. “Instead of building a 
‘Christian Commonwealth,’ the supreme law of the land established a secular state. The 
opening clause of its first amendment introduced the radical notion that the state had no voice 
concerning matters of conscience . . . .” Id. “In debating the language of that amendment, the 
first House of Representatives rejected a Senate proposal that would have made possible the 
establishment of the Christian religion or of some aspect of Christian orthodoxy.” Id. Despite 
their recent history, they left the people ‘free’ in matters of religion. Id.; see MICHAEL 
NOVAK,  ON TWO WINGS: HUMBLE FAITH AND COMMON SENSE AT THE AMERICAN 
FOUNDING  (2002). 
 40. JAMES D. RICHARDSON, George Washington Farewell Address, in 1 A COMPILATION 
OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 213, 220 (1897). 
 41. Fagan, supra note 39, at 1. 
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being of individuals, families, and the community.”42 It turns out 
that the practice of religion has a significant effect on “happiness and 
an overall sense of [personal] well-being.”43 And because “[h]appy 
people tend to be productive and law-abiding[,]” they make 
good  citizens.44 
On the other hand, religions can also be used to polarize 
societies. In India, religion has been used to divide people, initially 
by the British and later by those who believed in majoritarianism and 
indulged in communal politics.45 Today, India continues to face this 
challenge. A report by the United States Commission on 
International Religious Freedom criticized undue restrictions placed 
on free exercise of freedom of religion in India.46 Similarly, a report 
by the European Parliament categorized India among countries of 
 
 42. Id.; see Muninder K. Ahluwalia et al., Sikhism and Positive Psychology, in RELIGION 
AND SPIRITUALITY ACROSS CULTURES 125 (Chu Kim-Prieto ed., 2014). The author notes the 
social blessings of believing and urges policymakers to explore the benefits of religious practice. 
Fagan, supra note 39, at 1 n.1; see also 1 THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN FAMILY: 
AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 85 (Marilyn J. Coleman & Lawrence H. Ganong eds., 2014). 
 43. Fagan, supra note 39, at 9; see also ALEJO JOSÉ G. SISON, HAPPINESS AND VIRTUE 
ETHICS IN BUSINESS: THE ULTIMATE VALUE PROPOSITION 214–20 (2015); William V. 
D’Antonio, The Family and Religion: Exploring a Changing Relationship, 19 J. FOR SCI. 
STUDY RELIGION, 89, 89 (1980); Shobhna Joshi et al., Religious Belief and Its Relation to 
Psychological Well-Being, 34 J. INDIAN ACAD. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 345, 345–54 (2008); 
Shobhna Joshi & Shilpa Kumari, Religious Beliefs and Mental Health: An Empirical Review, 14 
DELHI PSYCHIATRY J. 40, 40 (2011); David B. Larson & Susan S. Larson, Religious 
Commitment and Health, 17(1) SECOND OPINION 26, 26–40 (1991); David O. Moberg, The 
Development of Social Indicators of Spiritual Well-Being for Quality of Life Research, in 
SPIRITUAL WELL-BEING: SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 1 (David O. Moberg ed., 1979); 
Rodney Stark, Psychopathology and Religious Commitment, 12 REV. RELIGIOUS RES. 165, 165–
76 (1971); David R. Williams et al., Religion and Psychological Distress in a Community 
Sample, 32 SOC. SCI. MED. 1257, 1257–62 (1991). 
 44. Fagan, supra note 39, at 9. 
 45. BIPAN CHANDRA ET AL., INDIA SINCE INDEPENDENCE (rev. ed. 2008). The authors 
note that Jawaharlal Nehru was one of the first leaders of the freedom movement to “see 
communalism as the Indian form of Fascism.” Id. at 38. Nehru wrote: 
  Communalism bears a shirking resemblance to the various forms of fascism 
that we have seen in other countries. It is in fact the Indian version of fascism. We 
know the evils that have flown from fascism. In India we have known also the evils 
and disasters that have resulted from communal conflict. A combination of these 
two is this something that can only bring grave perils and disasters in its train. 
Souribandhu Kar, Relevance of Jawaharlal Nehru, ODISHA REV., Jan. 2015, at 56. 
 46. U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ANN. REP. 2015 149–53 (2015), 
http://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/USCIRF%20Annual%20Report%202015%20%282
%29.pdf. 
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particular concern.47 The immediate attack on religious freedom 
through the use of identity politics comes from those who profess 
and swear to Hindutva ideology.48 Adherents of Hindutva use 
political power and law to create social tensions.49 
Having spoken of the importance and inherent social value of 
freedom in matters related to religion, we shall discuss the 
significance of secularism for the religious minorities in India. We 
will also examine how the Indian Supreme Court has narrowed the 
scope of constitutionally guaranteed freedom of religion by 
propounding the essentiality test.  
We argue that the essentiality test denies religious adherents of 
constitutionally granted rights and impermissibly substitutes the 
judgment of the Court for religious conscience. We then cite two 
examples of the Court’s use of the essentiality test to restrict religious 
freedom, as seen in the cases on conversion and affirmative action, 
and the cow slaughter ban. Next, we argue that one way to 
strengthen religious freedom in India would be to remove the 
essentiality test from Supreme Court jurisprudence. We argue that 
this test should ideally be rejected by the Court itself. If not, then it 
should be applied consistently based on the original method of 
determining the essentiality of a religious practice. This original 
 
 47. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT INTERGROUP ON FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF AND 
RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT: THE STATE OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR 
BELIEF IN THE WORLD 11, 40 (June 2015), http://www.religiousfreedom.eu/file /2015/
06/2014-Intergroup-Report-FINAL.pdf. 
 48. The term Hindutva was coined by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar. It sought to define 
Indian culture as a manifestation of Hindu values. See VINAYAK DAMODAR SAVARKAR, 
HINDUTVA: WHO IS A HINDU? (5th ed. 1969). It is the militant Hindu ideology which 
believes that India belongs exclusively to Hindus and followers of Abrahamic religions have 
extra-territorial loyalties. While Hinduism is a highly tolerant and inclusive religion, Hindutva 
is entirely exclusionary. There have been frequent utterances by the RSS and BJP leaders and 
the Prime Minister has failed to take any concrete action against these leaders. See, e.g., 
Siddharth Varadarajan, Shame on You, Mr. Culture Minister, WIRE (Sept. 17, 2015), 
http://thewire.in/10858/shame-on-you-mr-culture-minister/. This, in turn, creates fear in 
the minds of religious minorities. Julio Ribeiro, a former Director General of Police, recently 
admitted that since the 2014 general elections he has lived in fear, and his small, peaceful 
community of Christians is being targeted. See Julio Ribeiro, As a Christian, Suddenly I Am a 
Stranger in My Own Country, Writes Julio Ribeiro, INDIAN EXPRESS, http://indianexpress.
com/article/opinion/columns/i-feel-i-am-on-a-hit-list/ (last updated Mar. 17, 2015). There 
are a number of such strands to pick at. However, we shall return to them in the last Part of 
this paper when we talk to social stability in particular. 
 49. See, e.g., Ribeiro, supra note 48; Varadarajan, supra note 48. 
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method relies only on the relevant religious scriptures or texts in 
accordance with the established rules of interpretation of those texts 
under a particular religion or religious denomination. Thus, Part II 
will discuss the idea of secularism as employed in India and the 
guarantees of religious freedom under the Indian constitutional 
scheme.50 Part III will then consider the manner in which judicial 
tinkering has eroded religious freedom over the years. 
II. INDIAN SECULARISM, CONSTITUTION, AND THE 
ESSENTIALITY  TEST 
A. History of Secularism 
Secularism in India, unlike the West, was not designed to create a 
wall of separation between church and state.51 It was shaped to assure 
minorities that their culture, religion, and identity would be 
protected and that a majoritarian view would not be imposed on 
them.52 Thus, Indian secularism goes much beyond mere state 
 
 50. The Preamble provides for justice—social, political, and economic—which is 
expected to create conditions ripe for liberty of thought, opinion, and beliefs. INDIA CONST. 
pmbl. The operational part of the Indian Constitution provides for freedom of religion as an 
individual’s right, through Article 25. Id. at art. 25. This applies even to non-citizens. Id. 
There is also group application of this freedom through Article 26, which permits each 
denomination to own, acquire, and administer property. Id. art. 26, cls. b–c. While Articles 29 
and 30 ensure cultural rights of minorities, id. arts. 29–30, Articles 14, 15, and 16 provide 
that religion cannot be used as grounds for discrimination, id. arts. 14–16. Article 51A, puts 
the onus on all citizens, as a fundamental duty, to promote the spirit of common brotherhood 
among all people transcending religious, linguistic, and regional or sectional diversities, id. 
art.  51A, cl. e, while valuing and preserving the rich heritage of composite culture, id. art. 
51A,  cl.  f. 
 51. See DONALD EUGENE SMITH, INDIA AS A SECULAR STATE 3, 159 (1963). The term 
secularism implies three things in most Western democracies: freedom of religion, equal 
citizenship to each citizen regardless of his or her religion, and the separation of religion and 
state. Id. at 4. 
One of the core principles in the constitutions of Western democracies has been this 
separation, with the state asserting its political authority in matters of law, while 
accepting every individual’s right to pursue his or her own religion and the right of 
religion to shape its own concepts of spirituality. In the West everyone is equal 
under law, and subject to the same laws irrespective of his or her religion. 
Enhancing Religious Freedom in Developing Countries, BUDAPEST INT’L MODEL UNITED 
NATIONS 4 (6th session), http://www.bimun.hu/documents/cgs/HRC_Enhancing_relig
ious_freedom.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2016) [hereinafter Enhancing Religious Freedom]. 
 52. Secularism in India “means equal treatment of all religions.” SMITH, supra note 51, 
at 4. “Religion in India continues to assert its political authority in matters of personal law.” 
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neutrality in matters of religion. Protection of minority rights is an 
essential facet of Indian secularism. Minorities have almost an 
absolute right to preserve their languages, scripts, and cultures. They 
are also entitled to establish and administer educational institutions, 
including universities, of their choice. Such institutions cannot be 
denied State aid just because they are managed by minorities. These 
rights are opposed by the rightist parties who consider them as an 
appeasement of minorities. 
Taking the European experience as the reference point of 
secularism, some scholars have argued that secularism is an alien 
concept in India.53 They claim that it does not match either the 
configuration of Indian society or the convictions of its people.54 
However, such claims overlook the important reasons for adopting 
secularism as an organizing principle of Indian society—reasons that 
are both moral as well as pragmatic.55 These claims forget that 
secularism presents perhaps the only feasible option to regulate 
intergroup behavior, at least in the circumstances that have ensnared 
Indian society since the early twentieth century.56 Secularism was 
 
Id.; see RELIGION AND PERSONAL LAW IN SECULAR INDIA: A CALL TO JUDGMENT 2–3 
(Gerald James Larson ed., 2001). 
 53. See, e.g., T.N. Madan, Secularism in Its Place, in SECULARISM AND ITS CRITICS, 
297, 298–99 (Rajeev Bhargava ed., 1998) (arguing that for a majority of the people, 
secularism is a “vacuous word” as it does not know “whether it is desirable to privatize 
religion, and if it is, how this may be done”). The author claims that it is “moral arrogance” 
and “political folly,” for a secularist minority “to stigmatize the majority as primordially 
oriented and to preach secularism to the latter as the law of human existence.” Id. at 298–99. 
He makes this argument because he claims that religion is especially important to the people of 
South Asia. Id. at 299. 
 54. For more on arguments around “Indian Secularism,” see generally STUART 
CORBRIDGE & JOHN HARRISS, REINVENTING INDIA: LIBERALIZATION, HINDU NATIONALISM 
AND POPULAR DEMOCRACY (2000); SECULARISM: CONCEPT AND PRACTICE 105–07 (A.K. 
Lal ed., 1998); Romila Thapar, Public Lecture in Memory of Dr. Asghar Ali Engineer 
(Oct.  26, 2015), http://www.csss-isla.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Roimila-Thapars
-Lecture1.pdf. 
 55. Neera Chandhoke, Why is Secularism Important for India, in CONTEMPORARY 
INDIA: ECONOMY, SOCIETY, POLITICS 288, 292–305 (Neera Chandhoke & Praveen 
Priyadarshi eds., 2009). 
 56. See SHWETA DAMLE, SECULARISM AND SECULAR ACTION 16 (2007). 
The 25 years period between 1920s and 1940s had witnessed momentous and 
decisive political events, which culminated in the partition of India in 1947. . . . 
Mahatma Gandhi emerged as a national leader . . . . [P]reviously marginalized 
groups were politically mobilized and Indian society was united as never before. But 
the deep social divisions were never erased. The hold of religion on the popular 
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adopted as an organizing principle of Indian society for primarily two 
reasons. First, it “manage[s] the irreconcilable tension between 
religious groups” by “provid[ing] for equality of all religions,”57 and 
second, it “spell[s] out the relationship between the state and 
different religious groups” by “distanc[ing] the state from all 
religious groups,”58 thereby establishing that the “majority group 
(Hindus) would not be privileged in any manner.”59 The goal was to 
discourage even the pretense that a majority group had any right to 
stamp the body politic with its ethos; thus, secularism was meant to 
assure minorities that they had a legitimate place in the country and 
that they would not be discriminated against. It was in pursuit of 
these objectives that Pandit Nehru declared: “The government of a 
country like India, with many religions that have secured great and 
devoted followings for generations, can never function satisfactorily 
in the modern age except on a secular basis.”60 
 
psyche was always there. Religion was politicized and made the propellant of a 
political movement which finally led to partition. The post-partition period saw 
large-scale massacres, abductions and communal frenzy. The ideology of secularism 
was adopted not as it was conceived in the west in opposition to religion, but as 
suited for Indian society—in opposition to communalism. 
Id. 
 57. The Constitution contains three articles, which forbid the State to discriminate 
against its citizens on the basis of, among other things, religion. INDIA CONST. art. 15, § 1. 
The general statement, and the most important, is the first clause of Article 15. Id. The second 
clause of the same article ensures non-discrimination in regard to “access” of public spaces. Id. 
art. 15, § 2. Similarly, Article 16 prohibits discrimination with regard to “employment under 
the State,” and Article 29 prohibits discrimination with regard to admission in “educational 
institutions” either maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds. Id. art. 16, §§ 
1–2, art. 29, § 2; see also Erik Reenberg Sand, State and Religion in India: The Indian Secular 
Model, 19 NORDIC J. RELIGION & SOC., no. 2, 2006, at 3, 4, 7. 
 58. This “distancing” has been noted by various authors who suggest that in countries 
where there is a plurality of religions, like India, the secular state often sees itself as neutral in 
its relationship to these religions. Charles Taylor, Modes of Secularism, in SECULARISM AND ITS 
CRITICS 31–53 (Rajeev Bhargava ed., 1998). Two constitutional provisions are instructive in 
this regard—the first is Article 27—which forbids the State to collect taxes for the purpose of 
promoting religion. INDIA CONST. art. 27. The other is Article 28, which rules out any 
religious instruction from an educational institution wholly maintained by State funds. Id. 
art.  28, § 1. 
 59.  The Secularism in India, HUBPAGES (June 16, 2016), http://hubpages.com/pol
itics/The-Secularism-in-India. 
 60. This statement has been quoted by many authors. See SMITH, supra note 51, at 139 
(quoting Nehru in The Hindu on Sept. 13, 1950); see also Tariq Hameed Bhatti, Political 
Legacy of the Muslims in India: An Overview, 18 J. POL. STUD., 225, 231–32 (2011); Kuldip 
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The first reason secularism was adopted as a fundamental 
principle is that it helps prevent religious strife by establishing 
equality between all religions. This principle of equality goes beyond 
the assurance that everyone has the freedom to practice their 
religion, which was codified in Article 25 of the fundamental rights 
chapter of the Constitution.61 Nehru stated: 
Now, strictly speaking, we do not need to proclaim secularism in 
order to grant religious freedom. This freedom can emerge from, 
and form part of the Fundamental Rights that are assured to every 
citizen. But a secular State cannot stop at granting the right to 
religion. The principle of secularism goes further and establishes 
equality between all religious groups.62 
The concept of equality or sameness of all religions was inspired 
by the Hindu doctrine of sarva dharma sambhava, which permeated 
Gandhi’s understanding of religious tolerance.63 Dr. Radhakrishnan 
phrased it this way: 
We hold that no one religion should be given preferential status, or 
unique distinction, that no one religion should be accorded special 
privileges in national life or international relations for that would 
be a violation of the basic principles of democracy and contrary to 
the best interest of religion and government. . . . No group of 
 
Nayar, Editorial, Between the Lines Not by Bread Alone, DAILY STAR, (Oct. 21, 2003), 
http://archive.thedailystar.net/2003/10/21/d31021020427.htm. 
 61. INDIA CONST. art. 25. 
 62. Chandhoke, supra note 55, at 297–98; see also GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN, THE 
WHEEL OF LAW: INDIA’S SECULARISM IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 147 
(2003) (“Secularism is . . . more than a passive attitude of religious tolerance. It is a positive 
concept of equal treatment of all religions.”). 
 63. For sarva dharma sambhava as the Gandhian understanding of religious tolerance, 
see SECULARISM: CONCEPT AND PRACTICE, supra note 54. With respect to the idea of 
“equality” of Indian secularism—”equal respect,” see James Chiriyankandath, ‘Creating a 
Secular State in a Religious Country’: The Debate in the Indian Constituent Assembly, J. 
COMMONWEATH & COMP. POL., July 2000, at 1, 10; Shefali Jha, Secularism in the Constituent 
Assembly Debates, 1946–50, 2002 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 3175, 3176–80. For “state 
equidistance,” see SHREE GOVIND MISHRA, DEMOCRACY IN INDIA (2000). For “symmetry of 
treatment,” see AMARTYA SEN, THE ARGUMENTATIVE INDIAN: WRITINGS ON INDIAN 
HISTORY, CULTURE AND IDENTITY (2005). See generally Rina Verma Williams & Laura 
Dudley Jenkins, Secular Anxieties and Transnational Engagements in India, in MULTIPLE 
SECULARITIES BEYOND THE WEST: RELIGION AND MODERNITY IN THE GLOBAL AGE (Marian 
Burchardt et al. eds., 2015) (discussing India’s unique approach to secularism and how it has 
been shaped). 
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citizens shall arrogate to itself rights and privileges which it denies 
to others. No person shall suffer any form of disability or 
discrimination because of his religion but all alike should be free to 
share to the fullest degree in the common life.64 
If we were to stop here, secularism would be rendered redundant 
because “just as the freedom of religion does not necessarily need 
secularism to support it, equality of religions can be established via 
the fundamental right of equality.”65 But secularism is not mere 
equality of religions.  
 The second reason that secularism was adopted as a fundamental 
principle is that “secularism extends beyond equality and freedom to 
declare that the state is not aligned to any particular religion.”66 
Thus, secularism was also intended to assure minorities that the 
religion of the majority community would not be given any 
preference by the State. It is “this particular commitment that 
establishes the credentials of a Secular state.”67 For example, since 
Pakistan had become a theocratic state, such an assurance for Indian 
Muslims was essential.68 Due to this assurance, a massive majority of 
Muslims decided to stay in India.  
The Indian position on secularism during the initial years of the 
Republic, in the words of the liberal Nehru, was that “[a]nything 
 
 64. RADHAKRISHNAN, RECOVERY OF FAITH 202 (1955). 
 65. The Secularism in India, supra note 59. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Chandhoke, supra note 55, at 298. “Secularism, by outstripping freedom and 
equality, stipulates that the state will maintain an attitude of principled distance from all 
religious groups. It also contracts that the state would neither align itself with any particular 
religion, especially the majority religion, nor pursue any religious tasks of its own.” NEERA 
CHANDHOKE, BEYOND SECULARISM: THE RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES (1999). 
 68. This can be seen clearly from Dr. B.R. Ambedkar’s response in the Constituent 
Assembly to Congressman Mahavir Tyagi. 3 CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY OF INDIA DEBATES 
(May 1, 1947), http://164.100.47.192/Loksabha/Debates/cadebatefiles/C01051947.html 
(statement of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar). Then later, in light of wide-scale rioting, massacres, and 
looting of property during the Partition, it was suggested that any consideration of minority 
rights should be postponed until Pakistan’s stance on the issue became clear. Id. The 
former  responded: 
Rights of minorities should be absolute rights. They should not be subject to any 
consideration as to what another party may like to do to minorities within its 
jurisdiction. . . . I think that the rights which are indicated in clause 18 are rights 
which every minority, irrespective of any other consideration is entitled to claim. 
Id. As such, Indian secularism was about managing the differences and providing a semblance 
of protection to the minorities—whether religious, cultural, or identity based. 
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that creates such an apprehension [of discrimination] in the minds of 
any group in India is to be deprecated. It tends to disturb and it is 
opposed to our secular ideal,”69 in that it tends to remove a society 
from its democratic ideals. In sum, secularism was designed to 
regulate debilitating religious strife, to assure the minorities of their 
safety, and to calm any apprehension that the country would align 
itself with the dominant religion. It follows, then, that religion itself 
was not sought to be discouraged.70  
Alongside balancing the diverse milieu of the nation by providing 
for its own blend of secularism, the Indian Constitution also sought 
to create a progressive society based on scientific temper. It thus 
mandated that the State should intervene in religious affairs only if 
social welfare demanded it.71 The question then arises—how to 
decide whether an activity is religious or secular? This brings forth 
other questions—what is religion and which practices are religious? 
B. The Supreme Court as Clergy 
The Indian Supreme Court answered this question in the Shirur 
Mutt case.72 It held that the term “religion” in Article 25 covers all 
rituals and practices that are integral to the religion.73 In this 
manner, the judiciary took it upon itself to determine what is integral 
to religion.74 In doing so, it impliedly rejected the “assertion test” 
 
 69. Victor Z. Narivelil, Nehru and the Secular State of India (Feb. 1968) (unpublished 
M.A. thesis, Loyola University), http://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/2302 (quoting 
Jawaharlal Nehru in Circular to the Pradesh Congress Committees (Aug. 1954)). 
 70. See BRENDA COSSMAN & RATNA KAPUR, SECULARISM’S LAST SIGH? HINDUTVA 
AND THE (MIS)RULE OF LAW (1999); JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: AN ANTHOLOGY 327 (S. Gopal 
ed., 1980). 
 71. Gandhi v. State of Bombay, 1954 SCR 1035, 1062 (India). The State has the power 
to regulate secular activities associated with religious practice, but not the regulation of 
“religious practices” as such. Id. at 1060. The court noted that the activities, which the State 
seeks to regulate, must be of an “economic, commercial or political character though they are 
associated with religious practices”. Id. at 1063. 
 72. Comm’r, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha 
Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, 1954 SCR 1005, 1021 (India) [hereinafter Shirur Mutt]. 
 73. The question is, where is the line to be drawn between what are matters of religion 
and what are not. Id. at 1022 
 74.  A commissioner of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments is empowered, 
under the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act of 1951, to frame and 
settle a scheme if he had a reason to believe that the religious institution was mismanaging the 
funds placed under its care. Id. at 1008. In this case, he exercised this power over the Shirur 
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used in the United States, “whereby a [plaintiff] could . . . assert that 
a particular practice was a religious practice” and courts would not 
probe any further.75 “This exercise of determining the essential 
practice of a religion leads to obscure results and tends to lead the 
court into an area which . . . is beyond its competence.”76 
Nonetheless, it is the judge-made law that determines the scope of 
religion in India.77 
The Indian Supreme Court’s test for arriving at the definition of 
core religious practices entitled to protection by freedom of religion 
 
Mutt. Id. The Mutt challenged this interference as being a violation of its freedom of religion 
under Articles 25(1) and 26. Id. The State argued that it was allowed to do so under Article 
25(2)(a) as it was regulating the secular function of the Mutt and that Article 25(1) only 
covered the relationship between the followers and the deity. Id. The Supreme Court rejected 
this narrow understanding of religion. Id. However, the court didn’t base its judgment on an 
assertion by the Mutt; but answered the question of what a religion is. Id at 1023–24. Thereby, 
it took upon itself the power to do so again. This, over the years, has led to curtailing the 
religious freedoms, especially when involving minorities. 
 75. Rajeev Dhavan, Religious Freedom in India, 35 AM. J. COMP. L. 209, 220 (1987). 
 76. Mustafa, supra note 8. During the British period, courts had historically relied upon 
the advice of pandits and maulvis when “called upon to decide on matters pertaining to 
religious rights of the Indians.” Id. As texts were translated into English, “courts took over 
completely.” Id. Judges began “treat[ing] these translated texts as law in themselves.” Id. 
However, they overlooked the fact that they were but a part of the entire universe of 
knowledge. A few wrong decisions, which in the past would be remedied from one case to 
another, got entrenched in the “doctrine of precedent.” Id. This brought rigidity into personal 
laws, which are certain civil, primarily family, laws that vary by religious community. Id. Most 
common examples relate to laws around marriage, divorce, succession, etc. Id. Post-
Independence, “[w]ith regard to freedom of religion, the courts continued the British practice 
of interpreting texts and other evidence [casting aside men, either learned or the common 
masses] to come to [the] conclusion as to the existence and centrality of the religious 
practice.” Id. This has led to the situation where the judiciary is defining what religion is; and 
this is in violation of the liberty given to religion by the Magna Carta itself. In this context, see 
Dhavan, supra note 75, at 219–20. Dhavan also argues that in the process of ascribing an 
interpretation to religion, many “egregious blunders” were committed by the British. Id. 
These blunders led to rigidity in the personal law space. Id. Continuing to follow the same 
pattern post-independence only enhanced the problem. Id. 
 77. In Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan, 1964 SCR (1) 561 (India), the court observed 
that it could be possible that while determining the centrality of a practice to a particular 
community, the evidence could reveal that the community has varied opinions with regard to 
the importance of the practice in question. In such cases, they stated that it would be for the 
court to decide whether the practice is of a religious character and integral to the community. 
Id. at 621. Thus, the court ascribed for itself the role of a pandit, maulvi, or clergy—something 
that they clearly are not entitled to under the Constitution. Id. 
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under the Indian Constitution is called the essentiality test.78 The 
Supreme Court decides the issue of essentiality in the following 
manner: “First, matters of religion w[ill] be distinguished from 
secular practices.”79 This is indeed quite a task. Second, a religious 
community must consider the practice in question an integral part of 
its religion.80 For example: 
 
 The “essentiality test” was originally crystallised in the temple 
entry case. The court engaged itself with the question of whether 
untouchability, manifested in restrictions on temple entry was an 
“essential part of the Hindu religion.” The court after examining 
selective Hindu texts came to the conclusion that untouchability 
was not an essential Hindu practice.81 
 
Third, even if a practice is considered an “essential and integral part 
of” its religion, such a practice “w[ill] not be automatically deemed 
‘a matter of religion’ if it is found . . . to have sprung from 
superstitious beliefs.”82 Finally, “the Court will carefully scrutinise 
the claims of religious practices for the protection of Art. 26(b).”83 
The mischief of this essentiality test is evident in the Gram Sabha 
case.84 In this case, members of a particular sect claimed that 
capturing and worshiping a live cobra during Nagpanchami, a 
festival in which snakes are worshipped and offered milk, was an 
 
 78. “Under this test before granting constitutional protection, the court goes into the 
question of the nature of the particular belief and the degree of importance attached to the 
belief by the concerned community.” Mustafa, supra note 8. 
 79. B. Parameswara Rao, “Matters of Religion,” 5 J. INDIAN L. INST. 509, 512 (1963). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Faizan Mustafa, Haji Ali Verdict: Can We Permit Sati, Polygamy If They Are 
Essential Practices, HINDUSTAN TIMES (Aug. 30, 2016, 00:23 IST), http://www.hindus
tantimes.com/analysis/haji-ali-verdict-can-we-permit-sati-polygamy-if-they-are-essential-practi
ces/story-PHmqkV18kpx8ImMoE2hmHM.html; see also Devaruand v. State of Mysore, 1958 
SCR 895 (India). A more nuanced approach was adopted in Adithayan v. Travancore 
Devaswom Bd., Civ. App. No. 6965 of 1996 (India Oct. 3, 2002), where the Court relied on 
Article 17 to reject a freedom of religion argument for appointing only Brahmin priests. 
 82. Rao, supra note 79, at 512. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Gram Sabha of Village Battis Shirala v. Union of India, Writ Pet. No. 8645 of 2013 
& Pub. Interest Litig. No. 75 of 2011, § 11 (Bombay H.C. July 15, 2014) [hereinafter 
Gram  Sabha]. 
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essential part of their religion.85 Whereas the plaintiffs relied on the 
text of Shrinath Lilamrut, a local religious text that prescribes the 
practice, the judiciary relied on a scholarly history of the Dharma 
Shastras, which are the general religious texts of Hindus.86 Based on 
the scholar’s treatment of the text, the Court held that the act could 
not have been an essential practice of the petitioners’ religion.87 India 
is a huge country with huge diversity in the religious and cultural 
norms of its people. The apex court should have kept this diversity in 
mind. Neither Hindus nor Muslims nor Christians are homogenous 
communities. There are Muslim sects, like Khojas and Memons, who 
follow several Hindu practices. Similarly, the Hindu caste system to 
some extent is prevalent even among Christians. 
In another case, a Muslim police officer in the Kerala High 
Court challenged a regulation that prohibited him from growing a 
beard.88 In this matter, instead of looking at sources of Islamic law 
on the essentiality of beards in Islam, the court rejected the petition 
and based its opinion on the irrelevant fact that certain Muslim 
dignitaries did not have beards and that the petitioner himself had 
 
 85. Id. § 5. 
 86. Id. §§ 5, 13–14. 
 87. We can group this case with Quareshi v. State of Bihar, 1959 SCR 629, 672, 689–90 
(India), and Ramesh Sharma v. State of Himachal Pradesh, CWP No. 9257 of 2011, §§ 31, 81, 
85 (Himachal Pradesh H.C. Sept. 26, 2014). In these matters, empirical evidence of 
widespread practice was overlooked in holdings against animal sacrifice. While we do not 
support the practice, we do believe that, constitutionally, the right to accept or reject these 
practices lies with religious observers themselves. The protection under Article 25, in its truest 
sense, was meant to guarantee freedom to practice one’s own beliefs. See INDIA CONST. art. 25. 
The Supreme Court acknowledged this construction when it observed that, “subject to the 
restrictions which this article imposes, every person has a fundamental right under our 
Constitution . . . to entertain such religious belief as may be approved of by his judgment or 
conscience.” Gandhi v. State of Bombay, 1954 SCR 1035, 1062 (India). “The essential 
practice test is antithetical to this fundamental constitutional principle. Under the test, the 
court privileges certain religious practices over others by granting them legal protection.” 
Mustafa, supra note 8. In our humble opinion, the court does not have the expertise to decide 
which religious practice or ritual is essential or nonessential. 
 88. See Fasi v. Superintendent of Police, 1985 ILLJ Ker 463, §§ 1–2 (Kerala HC Feb. 
20), https://indiankanoon.org/doc/72808/ [hereinafter Fasi]. Recently, a thirty-four-year-
old Muslim soldier in the Indian army was fired after nearly a decade of service for insisting on 
growing a beard. S. Anandan, The Beard Truth: Army Wants Soldiers to Have a Clean Shave, 
HINDU (June 2, 2016, 23:53 IST), http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/the-beard-
truth-army-wants-soldiers-to-have-a-clean-shave/article8682647.ece (last updated Oct. 18, 
2016, 15:10 IST). 
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not sported a beard in previous years.89 Therefore, the court relied 
on unscientifically gathered anecdotal evidence of practice, rather 
than on religious texts. In direct opposition to this reliance on 
anecdotal evidence, “animal sacrifice” amongst Hindus in a different 
case was denied protection despite empirical evidence to the 
contrary.90 Regardless, even if a few Muslims do not have beards, it 
does not mean that having a beard is not an essential practice of 
Islam. The apex court itself had laid down that the essentiality of 
religious practices is to be decided keeping in view religious texts of 
the concerned religious group. 
Another interesting matter is that of the Tandava Dance case,91 
in which the Calcutta High Court found that the tandava dance was 
an essential practice of the Ananda Margi faith, only to be 
overturned by the Supreme Court.92 The apex court stated that the 
Ananda Margi faith had come into existence in 1955 but the 
tandava dance was adopted only in 1966; therefore, the court 
claimed that as the faith had existed without the practice at one 
point, the dance could not ever be accepted as an essential feature of 
the faith.93 The approach of the Supreme Court seems to identify a 
religious practice as an integral practice only if it existed when the 
religion was founded.94 This absurd logic would freeze religious 
 
 89. Fasi, supra note 88, § 4. The petitioner had placed reliance on the Sahih Al-Bukhari. 
Id. § 3. The teachings and practices of the Prophet Muhammad, called the Hadith, are the 
second most important source of Islamic law, and the al-Bukhari is one version of the Hadith. 
AISHA Y. MUSA, HADITH AS SCRIPTURE: DISCUSSIONS ON THE AUTHORITY OF PROPHETIC 
TRADITIONS IN ISLAM 1, 22 (2008). 
 90. Ramesh Sharma, CWP No. 9257 of 2011, §§ 30–31. In Sharma, the court rejected 
to provide animal sacrifice the protection of Article 25 by holding it to be a practice 
unsupported by religion. Id. 
 91. Comm’r of Police v. Avadhuta, Civ. App. No. 6230 of 1990 (India Mar. 11, 2004). 
 92. Id. §§ 1–6. 
 93. The court ignored the fact that Anant Murthiji, the religious head of the Ananda 
Margis, had prescribed the tandava dance in the revised version of Carya Carya—the only 
authoritative text of the faith. The fact that court made such a flimsy argument while 
overlooking the religious texts shows the manifest error in having an essentiality test. It is 
important to note that the dissenting opinion in this case relies on this authoritative text to 
grant the protection of Article 25 to the tandava dance. 
 94. By extension of this logic, one could claim that any practice of Islam adopted after 
the Prophet’s death would be considered optional and non-essential; and thus, not protected 
by Article 25. Similarly, no Christian or Jewish practice would be protected if it did not exist 
during the life of Jesus and Moses. These absurd decisions hamper the dynamic growth 
of  religion. 
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practices in time so that no religious reform could ever take place. 
This regressive decision has virtually closed the doors on reform and 
evolution for religions. 
The essentiality test reached absurd levels in Faruqui, when the 
Supreme Court dealt with the issue of the State acquiring the land 
over which the Ram Janma Bhoomi-Babri Masjid stood.95 One of 
the legal issues before the Court was whether the State had the 
power to acquire a mosque.96 Instead of settling the issue in favor of 
the State by relying on the principle of eminent domain, the Court 
questioned whether praying in the mosque was an essential practice 
of Islam.97 Under The Land Acquisition, 1894, government did have 
the power to acquire land for ‘public purposes.’  Thus this particular 
acquisition was well within governmental powers. There was no need 
at all to examine the issue whether a mosque was or was not an 
essential feature of Islam. The Court’s finding that a mosque may be 
acquired if there is a compelling State purpose was correct,98 but its 
determination on the status of the practice to pray in the mosque 
was absolutely fallacious. 
Before we conclude this Part, we must stress that freedom of 
religion, as intended by the framers of the Indian Constitution, was 
meant to guarantee freedom to practice one’s own beliefs based on 
 
 95. Faruqui v. Union of India, AIR 1995 SC 605 A, §§ 3, 6, 13 (India), 
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/37494799/ [hereinafter Faruqui]. Janma Bhoomi-Babri 
Masjid was a mosque for more than four centuries. Id. § 6. Two years after independence, in 
1949, unknown people placed idols at the mosque, leading to the claim that the Hindu God 
Rama was born there. Id. Hence, the name ‘Ram Janma Bhoomi-Babri Masjid (which means 
‘birthplace of Rama-Babri Mosque’). Id. The matter went to the civil court and doors of the 
mosque were locked. On  December 6, 1992, the mosque was demolished by a mob of Hindu 
rightists led by leading members of the current political party in power (i.e., BJP).  Two 
former BJP presidents and one current cabinet minister are still facing charges of criminal 
conspiracy. Even the Modi government told the Supreme Court in 2017 that prosecution has 
ample evidence against these three and therefore trial in the conspiracy should start. A lower 
court has previously absolved them from the charges. The main civil appeal on the title of 
property will be heard by a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court in December 2017. 
 96. Id. § 3. 
 97. Id. § 81. Much like the Temple Entry case, in Devaruand v. State of Mysore, 1958 
SCR 895, 914-15 (India), the Court needlessly went where it didn’t need to go, providing a 
rationale that is manifestly wrong. The Court notes that while the offering of prayers is an 
essential practice, the offering of such prayers in the mosque is not, unless the place has a 
certain religious significance in itself. Faruqui, supra note 95, § 81. This holding overlooks the 
centrality of congregational prayer to Islam and the essential nature of mosques. 
 98. Faruqui, supra note 95, § 95. 
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the concept of inward association of man with God. The Supreme 
Court has itself acknowledged as much by noting that “every person 
has a fundamental right . . . to entertain such religious belief as may 
be approved of by his judgment or conscience . . . .”99 The framers of 
the Indian Constitution wanted to give this autonomy to each 
individual. The essentiality test impinges on this autonomy because 
the judiciary assumes the power to decide what the essential or non-
essential parts of religious practices are. This test stands in direct 
contrast to the Court’s own words that “[n]o outside authority has 
any right to say that these are not essential parts of religion and it[] 
is not open to the secular authority of the State to restrict or prohibit 
them in any manner they like.”100 Moreover, the Supreme Court has 
itself acknowledged that “what constitutes the essential part of a 
religion is primarily to be ascertained with reference to the doctrines 
of that religion itself.”101 Each religion must have the autonomy to 
decide what its essential features and practices are, keeping in view its 
own religious texts (this is referred to as the autonomy thesis).102 In 
Singh, the Supreme Court further elaborated on the autonomy thesis 
by observing: “[A] religious denomination or [o]rganisation enjoys 
complete autonomy in the matter of deciding as to what rites and 
ceremonies are essential according to the tenets of the religion they 
hold . . . .”103 No outside authority has any jurisdiction to interfere 
with their decision in such matters.  
Thus, freedom of religion is an individual right under Article 
25(1) of the Indian Constitution as far as inward association of 
beliefs is concerned.104 It is a group right under Article 26(b) if the 
religious group recognizes the religious practices as essential.105 As 
United States Supreme Court Justice Black rightly held in Engel v. 
Vitale, “[R]eligion is too personal, too sacred, too holy to permit its 
‘unhallowed perversion’ by a civil magistrate.”106 
 
 99. Gandhi v. State of Bombay, 1954 SCR 1035, 1062 (India). 
 100. Id. at 1065. 
 101. Shirur Mutt, supra note 72, at 1025. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Singh v. State of Punjab, 1959 SCR Supp. (2) 499, 509 (India). 
 104. See Saheb v. State of Bombay, 1962 SCR Supp. (2) 496, 520–22 (India). 
 105. See id. 
 106. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 432 (1962). 
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As such, even a single nun is well within her right to consider a 
scarf essential to her faith.107 The cases discussed demonstrate that 
the judiciary has styled itself as the religious reformer108 to “cleanse” 
religions of superstitions and to reform them to suit its own idea of 
twenty-first-century rationality.109 The Supreme Court’s insistence on 
applying the essentiality test has struck at the very foundation of 
religious freedom in India.110 Due to the Court’s insistence on the 
doctrine of essentiality, the religious autonomy of the individual and 
an individual’s religious group outside of foundational text 
seemingly has no value.  
 
 107. This was a matter that has received some publicity in the last few months. In the 
lead-up to a pre-medical exam, the Supreme Court refused to let in students wearing a hijab. 
Utkarsh Anand, SC To PMT Students: Faith Won’t Disappear If You Don’t Wear Scarf (Hijab) 
One Day, INDIAN EXPRESS (July 25, 2015, 2:09 PM), http://indianexpress.com/article/
india/india-others/aipmt-supreme-court-refuses-to-allow-hijab-in-test/; see also Krishnadas 
Rajagopal, SC Refuses To Entertain Plea On Allowing Hijab During AIPMT Exams, HINDU 
(July 24, 2015, 19:06 IST), http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/sc-refuses-to-entert
ain-plea-on-allowing-hijab-during-aipmt-exams/article7461056.ece. Thereafter, on the day of 
the exam, a nun who refused to remove her veil was ‘barred’ from taking the exam. Shaju 
Philip, Nun In Headscarf ‘Barred’ From Medical Entrance Test, INDIAN EXPRESS, (July 26, 
2015, 7:46 AM), http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/keralite-nun-refuses-
to-take-aipmt-without-veil-holy-cross/. In the same exam, two students did receive the 
permission to wear the hijab, on grounds of freedom of religion from the Kerala High Court. 
See Anand, supra. 
 108. In this context, one author refers to the Indian courts as the “schizophrenic 
defender[s] of constitutional secularism.” Smita Narula, Book Review, 4 INT’L J. CONST. L. 
741, 746 (2006) (reviewing GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN, THE WHEEL OF LAW: INDIA’S 
SECULARISM IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT (2003)). 
 109. The court tries to apply the certainty of law to religious questions, where there is 
always a divergence of opinion. Faizan Mustafa, The Unfreedom of Religion, INDIAN EXPRESS 
(May 5, 2015, 12:04 AM), http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/the-
unfreedom-of-religion/. On a parallel path, Ronald Niezen—speaking of rights of First 
Nations in Canada as interpreted by the judiciary—helps clarify the fact that the judiciary 
prefers more bright-line answers, whereas the very nature of culture is subjective. See Ronald 
Niezen, Culture and the Judiciary: The Meaning of the Culture Concept as a Source of 
Aboriginal Rights in Canada, 18 CAN. J.L & SOC’Y 1, 13 (2003). Connecting this 
observation to religion, Justice Chinnappa Reddy accepted that religion had a similar nature 
and was incapable of precise definition. S.P. Mittal v. Union of India, 1983 SCR (1) 729, 737 
(India) (Reddy, J., dissenting). Religion, like culture, is uncertain, and it is beyond the 
mandate of Article 25 to judicially create certainty in religious matters. 
 110. This reformist zeal also goes against the initial assurance provided by the court to 
the religious leaders that it would determine the essential religious practices in accordance with 
the doctrines of the religion and the position enjoyed by the practices in the community. See 
Shirur Mutt, supra note 72, at 1005. 
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Ideally, Indian courts should have followed the wise words of 
Chief Justice Latham, of the Australian High Court, who explicitly 
observed, “What is religion to one is superstition to another.”111 
Moreover, the inward association thesis (the idea that each individual 
should be able to determine for themselves the essentiality of a 
religious practice) receives support from Article 29 of the Indian 
Constitution, which guarantees to every Indian citizen “having a 
distinct language, script or culture of [his] own . . . the right to 
conserve the same.”112  Cultures have a close affinity with religions. 
For example, Muslim Personal Law is a facet of Muslim culture in 
India. Moreover, religions and cultures influence and closely interact 
with each other.113 Thus, freedom of religion is an individualistic 
right under Article 25, and, therefore, an individual should be free to 
decide for himself what he considers essential or non-essential 
features of his religion. 
III. THE POLITICS OF RELIGION, DENIAL OF INDIVIDUAL CHOICE, 
AND SOCIAL INSTABILITY 
In this Part, we point out the various judicial decisions and 
political rhetoric, or, dare we say, narratives, that militate against the 
constitutional ideals of religious freedoms. There are three specific 
examples of religious instability in India today: anti-conversion laws, 
affirmative action, and the cow slaughter ban. 
A. Anti-Conversion Laws 
One of the most significant restrictions on religious freedom is 
the suppression of religious conversions.114 We believe that the 
 
 111. Adelaide Co of Jehovah Witnesses v Commonwealth (1943) 67 CLR 116, 
123  (Austl.). 
 112. INDIA CONST. art. 29, § 1. 
 113. See Abdul Aziz Said & Nathan C. Funk, The Role of Faith in Cross-Cultural Conflict 
Resolution, 9 PEACE & CONFLICT STUD. 37, 37 (2002). 
 114. Anti-conversion laws have arisen from a long history of religious activity in India. See 
Jonathan K. Stubbs, Persuading Thy Neighbor to be as Thyself: Constitutional Limits on 
Evangelism in the United States and India, 12 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 360, 363–71 (1994). 
Many Hindu princely states had promulgated anti-conversion laws “in an attempt to preserve 
Hindu religious identity in the face of British missionaries.” James Andrew Huff, Religious 
Freedom in India and Analysis of the Constitutionality of Anti-Conversion Laws, 10 RUTGERS 
J.L. & RELIGION 1, 4 (2009); see also Laura Dudley Jenkins, Legal Limits on Religious 
Conversion in India, 71 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 113–14 (2008). Some of these laws 
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decision of the Supreme Court in Stainislaus115—the most important 
case on the matter—inappropriately limits an individual’s freedom of 
religion. In this case, the constitutionality of the anti-conversion laws 
of the State of Madhya Pradesh and State of Orissa were examined 
by the Supreme Court. Orissa High Court had in fact held 
such  a  law as unconstitutional but the apex court upheld 
its  constitutionality. 
 If freedom of religion is required to promote individual beliefs 
emanating from the inward association doctrine, an individual must 
have freedom to change his or her beliefs and religion. Restricting 
one’s freedom to change his or her religion has a chilling effect on 
the concept of freedom of religion.116 Religious conversion is 
generally preceded by some crisis, which may be religious, 
psychological, cultural, or by a life situation that opens people up to 
new options.117 Thus, religious conversion can be a fundamental 
coping mechanism for an individual,118 or a quest for a fresh 
perspective through a new religion.119 Restricting this individual 
choice to adopt a new religion seriously undermines the fundamental 
idea of inward association on which the freedom of religion in India 
is based. Religious conversion is a dynamic, multifaceted process of 
 
included “[t]he Raigarh State Conversion Act 1936, the Patna Freedom of Religion Act of 
1942, the Sarguja State Apostasy Act 1945 and the Udaipur State Anti-Conversion Act 1946.” 
Huff, supra. Additionally, there were other laws “in Bikaner, Jodhpur, Kalahandi and Kota,” 
id., most of them being enacted “to counter Christian missionary activity and to ‘awaken 
tribesmen [to] their true Hindu identity.’” Faisal Mohammad Ali, Christian Anger at 
Conversion Law, BBC NEWS (Aug. 4, 2006, 16:08 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi
/south_asia/5246328.stm. See generally FAIZAN MUSTAFA & ANURAG SHARMA, 
CONVERSION: CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS (2003); Faizan Mustafa, Let’s 
Talk About Poverty First Before Faith and Conversions, HINDUSTAN TIMES (Dec. 25, 2014, 
4:34 IST), http://www.hindustantimes.com/comment/let-s-talk-about-poverty-first-before-
faith-and-conversions/story-iQr3XBh591lLhUD2yIh19N.html. 
 115. See Rev. Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1977 SCR (2) 611 (India). 
 116. Heiner Bielefeldt, Limitations on Religions Freedom Have ‘Chilling Effect,’ NEW 
EUROPE (Nov. 15, 2010), https://www.neweurope.eu/article/limitations-religions-freedom-
have-chilling-effect/. 
 117. LEWIS R. RAMBO, UNDERSTANDING RELIGIOUS CONVERSION 44 (1993). 
 118. See generally MUSTAFA & SHARMA, supra note 114. An individual under stress may 
change his religion to find solace in the new religion. Every convert undergoes a serious 
personal mental crisis before he decides to change his religion. 
 119. See PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, FAITH IN FLUX: CHANGES IN 
RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION IN THE U.S. (Apr. 2009), http://www.pewforum.org/files/2009/04
/fullreport.pdf. 
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individual choice, which, at times, may have an element of rejection 
and disillusionment with his or her existing religion or its practices. 
Conversion entails a transformation of an individual’s “sense of ‘root 
reality’” and a major change in one’s self-identification within a 
community.120 It is a state of dramatic personal upheaval. The State 
has no role to play in imposing this choice on its citizens. All persons 
should have the freedom to follow or convert to whichever religion 
they choose. 
However, this freedom has been challenged by anti-conversion 
laws.121 It has been argued that such laws are contrary to the 
Constitution as they pose a hindrance to the “propagation” of 
religion.122 Yet, the Indian Supreme Court has upheld their 
validity.123 In explaining the ambit of Article 25, the Supreme Court 
 
 120. RALPH W. HOOD, JR., PETER C. HILL & BERNARD SPILKA, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
RELIGION: AN EMPIRICAL APPROACH 210 (4th ed. 2009). 
 121. Two of these anti-conversion laws were the Orissa Freedom of Religion Act, 1967, 
No. 2, Acts of Parliament, 1968 (India), and the Madhya Pradesh Freedom of Religion Act, 
1968, No. 27, Acts of Parliament, 1968 (India). The court allowed both to stand. Today, this 
sort of legislation has mushroomed and as of now, five Indian states—Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, 
Gujarat, Chhattisgarh, and Himachal Pradesh—have anti-conversion laws in place to prevent 
“forced conversions.” Apart from this, Arunachal Pradesh has an anti-conversion law, but the 
government has not framed the rules needed to enforce it, and Rajasthan has a bill that has yet 
to be turned into law. The laws are strikingly similar; apart from the Himachal Pradesh 
legislation, all the laws were passed by Bharatiya Janata Party, the right-wing, pro-Hindutva 
political party. They all prohibit conversion from one religion to another by the use of force or 
allurement or by fraudulent means. See Orissa Freedom of Religion Act, 1967; Madhya 
Pradesh Freedom of Religion Act, 1968.  Allurement—also called inducement—is defined as a 
gift or material benefit, and force is defined as the threat of injury “including threat of divine 
displeasure or social excommunication.” Orissa Freedom of Religion Act, 1967; Madhya 
Pradesh Freedom of Religion Act, 1968. Less surprisingly, they do not prohibit “returning to 
one’s religion” or what is termed as Ghar Vapsi, which means that if Hindus reconvert to 
Hinduism, it will not be considered conversion under these anti-conversion laws. Mustafa, 
supra  note 114. 
 122. This argument had been accepted by the Orissa High Court in Hyde v. State of 
Orissa, AIR 1973 Ori 116 (Orissa HC Oct. 4, 1972), https://indiankanoon.org/doc
/453517/ [hereinafter Hyde], where the petitioners expressly averred that conversion was a 
part of the Christian religion. The Orissa High Court had noted that: “several petitioners have 
freely quoted from several Christian Scriptures of undoubted authority to show that 
propagating religion with a view to its spreading is a part of religious duty for every Christian 
and, therefore, must be considered as a part of religion. Learned Government Advocate[s] 
[did] not dispute this assertion of fact.” Id. § 4(h). It had finally recorded a finding that 
“Article 25(1) guarantees propagation of religion and conversion is a part of Christian 
religion.” Id. § 12(1). 
 123. The Indian Supreme Court, while reversing the judgment of the Orissa High Court, 
made no attempt to show that the question raised and decided was either irrelevant, or was 
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held that Clause 1 of the provision “does not grant [the] right to 
convert . . . [another] person to one’s own religion but to transmit 
or spread one’s religion by an exposition of its tenets.”124 The Court 
stated that “Article 25(1) guarantees ‘freedom of conscience’ to 
every citizen,” and “if a person purposely undertakes the conversion 
of another person to his religion, as distinguished from his effort to 
transmit or spread the tenets of his religion, that would impinge on” 
such a  guarantee.125 
The Supreme Court failed to discuss the definitions of 
inducement and allurement, which was the primary bone of 
contention.126 It also did not revert to the legislative history of 
Article 25—the term propagate was included in the Constitution as a 
compromise to assure Christians that it would include freedom to 
convert.127 Moreover, if one takes the reductionist understanding of 
propagation—given the court in this case128—the inclusion of such a 
term in the Indian Constitution would be rendered meaningless. 
The mere right to propagate for the enlightenment of others would 
already be covered under the right to free speech and expression 
under Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution. Thus, we submit 
 
wrongly decided. Not only this, the proposition was not even controverted by counsel 
appearing on behalf of the State. See Rev. Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1977 SCR (2) 
611, 908 (India); Faizan Mustafa, Constitutionality of Anti-Conversion Laws, STATESMAN (Jan. 
15, 2015), http://www.thestatesman.com/news/law/constitutionality-of-anti-conversion-
laws/44674.html. 
 124. Rev. Stainislaus, 1977 SCR (2) at 908. 
 125. Id. For a distinction between conversion and propagation simply for “the edification 
of others” the court has relied upon Gandhi v. State of Bombay, 1954 SCR 1035 (India). 
However, as stated by Robert D. Baird: “Whatever else might be said about these bills and 
their treatment by the Supreme Court, they at least present a constriction upon religion as 
constitutionally understood.” Robert D. Baird, Traditional Values, Governmental Values, and 
Religious Conflict in Contemporary India, 1998 BYU L. REV. 337, 353 (1998). 
 126. Mustafa, supra note 8. 
 127. The entire debate—with calls by Loknath Misra, Pandit Lakshmi, Kanta Maitra, T.T 
Krishnamachari, and K.M Munshi for this fundamental right not to be converted—is part of 
the legislative history of the Indian Constitution. The court overlooked these words, dialogues 
and discussions of the framers. See 7 CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES (Dec. 6, 1948), 
http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol7p20a.htm; 2 H.M. SEERVAI, CONSTITUT-
IONAL LAW OF INDIA: A CRITICAL COMMENTARY 1287 (4th ed. 1999). Seervai, probably one 
of India’s greatest constitutional jurists, refers to the Stainislaus decision as “productive of the 
greatest public mischief.” SEERVAI, supra, at 1290. 
 128. The reductionist understanding of propagation being that though one may transmit 
or spread the tenets of his religion, resultant conversion (if it occurs) of another person to his 
religion cannot be constitutionally protected. 
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that the right to convert was actually included in Article 25, and, as 
such, the decision of the Supreme Court in Stainislaus not only was 
erroneous but also led to instability in society,129 as Indian Christians 
feel they have been cheated in this matter.130 The assurances given to 
them in the Constituent Assembly on the inclusion of the word 
propagate have not been fulfilled, and the government has done 
nothing to remedy the situation arising out of the highly restrictive 
interpretation of the term propagation by the Supreme Court. 
B. Affirmative Action 
Another provision of law that impinges on freedom of religion 
and causes social instability is the presidential order under which only 
Hindus are entitled to the benefits of affirmative action.131 Non-
Hindus are not included in the definition of the Scheduled Caste.132 
Since 1951, political leaders have tried to control citizens’ freedom 
of choice by not allowing them to exit the Hindu religion, even 
when their inner consciousness prompts conversion to a different 
religion.133 By coercing people to stay within the Hindu religion, the 
 
 129. See The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom Annual 
Report 2015, which notes,  
[s]ince the [2014 general] election, religious minority communities have been 
subject to derogatory comments by politicians linked to the ruling Bharatiya Janata 
Party (BJP) and numerous violent attacks and forced conversions by Hindu 
nationalist groups, such as Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and Vishva Hindu 
Parishad (VHP). Christian NGOs and leaders report that their community is 
particularly at risk in states that have adopted ‘Freedom of Religion Act(s),’ 
commonly referred to as anti-conversion laws. 
U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 46, at 149–53 (there are entire 
segments within the report on forced conversions and anti-conversion laws). The recently 
released 2016 report also notes the sense of insecurity amongst religious minorities. U.S. 
COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ANN. REP 2016, 159–65 (2016), http://www. 
uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/USCIRF%202016%20Annual%20Report.pdf. 
 130. See Vishal Arora, Court Questions State’s ‘Anti-Conversion’ Law, WORLD WATCH 
MONITOR (Sep. 15, 2011), https://www.worldwatchmonitor.org/2011/09-September/arti
cle_120331.html/. 
 131. Yaroslav Trofimov, In India, ‘Untouchables’ Convert to Christianity—and Face Extra 
Bias, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 19, 2007, 11:59 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB11
9014428899931394. 
 132.  Frequently Asked Questions, MINISTRY OF SOC. JUSTICE AND EMPOWERMENT, 
http://socialjustice.nic.in/UserView/index?mid=28545#sc4 (last visited Nov. 24, 2017). 
 133. See Piyush Srivastava, ‘We Will Free India of Muslims and Christians by 2021’: DJS 
Leader Vows to Continue ‘Ghar Waspi’ Plans and Restore ‘Hindu Glory,’ DAILY MAIL.COM 
INDIA (Dec. 18, 2014, 22:45 EST), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews
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inward association concept is seriously undermined, particularly 
when political leaders put a heavy price on conversion. In a country 
of India’s size, competing in the “open category” instead of the 
“reserved category” almost negates the chances of selection for 
admission in educational institutions and State jobs.134 Moreover, the 
presidential order is in clear contravention of Article 15(1), which 
makes religion a prohibited ground for any State action. In the 
recent past, the Indian judiciary has unfortunately lent itself to the 
majoritarian agenda on this point. In the K.P Manu case,135 the 
Court held that a Dalit Christian converting to Hinduism would be 
entitled to reservation benefits as long as it could be proved that his 
forefathers belonged to a caste categorized as a Scheduled Caste.136 
In the times of Ghar Vapsi,137 the judgment seems to put a judicial 
seal on reconversion, thereby incentivizing it against the assurances 
given in 1950.138  Affirmative action should not be denied to anyone 
 
/article-2879597/We-free-India-Muslims-Christians-2021-DJS-leader-vows-continue-ghar-
wapsi-plans-restore-Hindu-glory.html. 
 134.  Open means general seats where everyone is eligible. Reserved means seats are 
reserved for the categories entitled to affirmative action. In a country of India’s size, 
competition is quite tough and if affirmative action is not there, some groups will have no 
representation at all both in education as well as in jobs. 
 135. K.P. Manu v. Chairman, Scrutiny Committee for Verification of Community 
Certificate, Civ. App. No. 7065 of 2008 (India Feb. 26, 2015). 
 136. Id. This judgment extended the earlier position laid down in Guntur Med. Coll. v. 
Rao, 1976 SCR (3) 1046 (India), https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1013438/ [hereinafter 
Rao], in which it was noted that a person did not need to be born a Hindu to get scheduled 
caste status. 
 137.  Hindu rightists consider reconversion of Muslims and Christians as Hindus as Ghar 
Vapsi, (i.e., ‘return home’) as they consider all Indian Muslims and Indian Christians to have 
been originally Hindus and they are now returning to their original faith. 
 138. The idea of incentivization comes from the fact that there are constitutional 
provisions of affirmative action in India for certain scheduled castes. Ira N. Gang et. al., Caste, 
Affirmative Action and Discrimination in India, CHRONIC POVERTY RESEARCH 
CENTRE  (2010), http://www.chronicpoverty.org/uploads/publication_files/gang_sen_yun.
pdf. Originally, an order by the President restricted the definition of “scheduled castes” only to 
those belonging to the Hindu faith. The Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, GAZETTE 
OF INDIA, EXTRAORDINARY, Part II, 148 (Aug. 10, 1950), http://lawmin.nic.in/legislative
/election/volume%201/rules%20&%20order%20under%20constitution/the%20constitution%
20(scheduled%20castes)%20order,%201950.pdf. The umbrella has been extended to Sikhs and 
Buddhists over the years; but not the non-Indic religions. There is an entire narrative to be 
told on the point, but that must be for another day. By an amendment, Sikhs and Buddhists 
too have been given affirmative action. In fact, the definition of Hindus in Article 25 itself 
includes these groups within the definition of Hindu. Interestingly Sikhs are legally speaking 
Hindus at the national level but in the State of Punjab, where Sikhs are a majority, they are 
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on conversion from Hinduism as conversion does not change the 
financial or social status of converts. 
C. The Cow Slaughter Ban 
Another matter that deserves some attention is the question of 
the cow slaughter ban. There is some evidence that in ancient India, 
Hindus ate beef.139 Today, a new version of Hinduism is being 
imposed not only on Hindus but on others as well. Individual 
autonomy even to eat certain foods is under threat due to the 
politics of cow slaughter. Hindu reverence of the cow is being 
imposed on followers of other religions, which has an adverse effect 
on butchers’ right to their occupation.140 
The Hindutva rhetoric has built up over time. It started with the 
needless dicta by a judge from the Punjab & Haryana High Court in 
1996.141 While hearing a bail application under the Prohibition of 
Cow Slaughter Act, the judge stated that five-year imprisonment for 
the offense of cow slaughter was too lenient.142 This issue has 
simmered for years and was picked up by the Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP) just before the 2014 general elections. Narendra Modi, the 
current Prime Minister of India, called out the government as 
 
considered a minority and enjoy the rights of minorities to establish and administer educational 
institutions of their choice. 
 139. Mahadev Chakravarti, Note, Beef-Eating in Ancient India, 7 SOC. SCIENTIST 51, 
51 (1979). Even the first author has been intimidated to write that Hindus, too, were beef 
eaters in ancient India. Four notices of defamation of one million rupees were sent to the 
author after recent draconian cattle rules notifications by the federal government. Faizan 
Mustafa, The Modi Government’s Cattle Rules May Not Pass the Legal Test, HINDUSTAN TIMES 
(July 5, 2017, 13:15 IST), http://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/the-modi-govt-s-new-
cattle-trade-ban-may-not-pass-legal-test/story-W2TWCVUuFCGFihHZDhcb8L.html. 
 140. Shashank Bengali & Parth M.N., Conservative Hindus Push Bans on Cattle Slaughter 
in India, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Mar. 25, 2015, 11:29 AM), http://www.latimes.com/
world/asia/la-fg-india-hindus-cattle-20150325-story.html. 
 141.  This is an unreported case; I read it in a newspaper in 1996. Such orders are not 
reported. But now we have laws which even impose life imprisonment. In March 2017, 
Gujarat State, through an amendment in the Animal Protection Act, began to impose life 
imprisonment without bail and a fine of half a million rupees on those involved in cow 
slaughter. For possession of beef, punishment can range from seven to ten years in prison. 
 142. Asghar Ali Engineer, Communalism and Communal Violence, 1996, 32 ECON. & 
POL. WKLY., 323, 323–24 (1997). 
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supporting a “pink revolution”143 that caused division among 
communities leading up to the election.144 After coming to power, 
the Modi government has kept the issue on a back-burner as revenue 
from beef exports has risen by nineteen percent in just one year.145 
In 2015, the same rhetoric was used in the run-up to the 
Haryana and Maharashtra state elections.146 While the BJP 
government has made amendments providing harsher punishment 
for possession of beef, twenty-six out of twenty-nine Indian states 
have had such laws for decades, and slaughter has been banned since 
1976. Therefore, discussion of stricter bans is largely regarded as 
political rhetoric aimed at persuading voters who are unaware of 
current law. However, after the Maharashtra election, the BJP 
government made amendments to the Maharashtra Animal 
Preservation (Amendment) Act, prohibiting the slaughter of bulls 
and bullocks and the possession and consumption of their meat as 
well.147 The amendment was challenged in the Bombay High Court, 
 
 143. E.g., K. Balchand, Modi Fears a ‘Pink Revolution,’ HINDU (Apr. 3, 2014, 12:55 
IST), http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/modi-fears-a-pink-revolution/ 
article5864109.ece. 
 144. See Puja Mehra, Meat Production Doubled in Gujarat in 10 Years, HINDU (Apr. 5, 
2014, 3:21 IST), http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/meat-production-
doubled-in-gujarat-in-10-years/article5872923.ece?ref=relatedNews (noting the fact that meat 
production doubled under Modi’s leadership over a ten-year period but that it may have been 
trying to create strife among communities by playing up the issue before the elections). The 
BJP manifesto promised a ban on cow slaughter, and during April 2014, ran the slogan “Modi 
ko matdan, gai ko jeevadan” [Vote for Modi, give life to the cow]. Elizabeth Soumya, Sacred 
Cows and Politics of Beef in India, ALJAZEERA (Apr. 20, 2014), http://www.aljaze
era.com/indepth/features/2014/04/india-bjp-piggybacks-cow-milk-votes-20144171421545
67121.html. 
 145. Cithara Paul, Red Meat Export Surge Gives Beef Ban a Red Face, NEW INDIAN 
EXPRESS (Mar. 8, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.newindianexpress.com/thesundaystandard/ 
Red-Meat-Export-Surge-Gives-Beef-Ban-a-Red-Face/2015/03/08/article2702789.ece (“As 
per the statistics [of] the Agricultural and Processed Food Products Export Development 
Authority (APEDA)—the government’s gatekeeper for exports—the production and export of 
red meat have registered a steady jump during the BJP Government.”). 
 146. Ajaz Ashraf, Bihar Polls: Will Voters Ignore Hindutva Effect and Trust BJP’s 
Development Plank?, FIRSTPOST (Oct. 20, 2015, 07:12 IST), http://www.firstpost.com/ 
politics/bihar-election-will-voters-ignore-the-hindutva-effect-and-trust-bjps-development-plan
k-2474412.html. 
 147. HC Decriminalises Possession of Beef with a Caveat, DECCAN HERALD (May 6, 2016, 
14:36 IST), http://www.deccanherald.com/content/544749/hc-decriminalises-possession-
beef-caveat.html. 
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which upheld the slaughter ban.148 The BJP government has now 
filed an appeal in the Supreme Court. Since a nine-judge bench of 
the Supreme Court in its August 24, 2017 judgment upheld the 
right to privacy as a fundamental right, there is hope the Court will 
consider eating habits as part of privacy. 
Moreover, the Hindutva rhetoric has caused great instability. In 
2015, a Muslim individual named Akhlaq was beaten by a mob in 
Dadri based on a rumor that his family was eating beef.149 All of the 
accused have been now released on bail.150 The police, apart from 
looking into the murder of Akhlaq, also sent the meat in question for 
forensic tests151—initial tests indicated the meat was mutton or goat 
meat. Different forensic labs have issued contradictory reports about 
whether the meat was beef or goat.152 No law permits killing of a 
human being, and, therefore, the question whether it was beef or 
mutton is irrelevant. Further, in Dadri, possession of beef was not 
an  offense.  
In 2017, Pehlu Khan, a Muslim, was similarly killed in a mob 
lynching for carrying dairy cows with proper purchase documents. 
The video of people beating him is in the public domain.  But all the 
six accused named by him in dying declarations too have been let off 
by the BJP government of Rajasthan as the police report says they 
 
 148. See Ashraf, supra note 146; Mukhtar v. State of Maharashtra, Writ Pet. No. 5731 of 
2015, § 221 (Bombay HC May 6, 2016), https://indiankanoon.org/doc/153513175
/?type=print [hereinafter Mukhtar]. 
 149. Aditi Vatsa, Dadri: Mob Kills Man, Injures Son over ‘Rumours’ that They Ate Beef, 
INDIAN Express (Dec. 25, 2015, 11:59 PM), http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-
others/next-door-to-delhi-mob-kills-50-year-old-injures-son-over-rumours-they-ate-beef/. 
   150.  Staff Reporter, Key Accused in Dadri Lynching Case Gets Bail, HINDU (Aug. 1, 
2017, 20:36 IST), http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/key-accused-in-
dadri-lynching-case-gets-bail/article19402152.ece/. 
 151. Suhasini Raj, Goat Meat, Not Beef, Found in Home of Indian Killed over Cow-
Slaughter Rumors, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com /2015/12/30
/world/asia/uttar-pradesh-india-cow-slaughter.html?_r=0. There was no ban on beef 
consumption in Dadri in the state of Uttar Pradesh, but such is the frenzy created by the BJP: 
that police went down an abhorrent path in the wake of a horrifying incident. The meat turned 
out to be goat; we still await a second analysis. Id. 
 152. Mohammad Ali, Dadri Meat Was Beef, Claims Fresh Forensic Report, HINDU (May 
31, 2016, 18:57 IST), http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/dadri-meat-
was-beef-claims-fresh-forensic-report/article8673383.ece. 
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are not guilty.153 Indira Jaisingh a former Additional Solicitor 
General, Supreme Court Lawyers: Prashant Bhushan and Colin 
Gonsalves, Human Rights Defender: Teesta Setalved, and many 
others, conducted an independent probe and have reported that the 
police are protecting the murderers of Pehlu Khan.154 Similar 
incidents took place in the eastern state of Jharkand.155 It is 
heartening that the Prime Minister at least has, on three different 
occasions, condemned cow vigilante groups and termed them 
criminals.156 But his words have had no impact on the ground. Thus 
we see that the Hindutva forces have created anti-Muslim sentiment 
related to cow slaughter, though the majority of Indians are non-
vegetarians, and poorer populations do consume beef derived from 
water buffalos.  The English language has just one word for both, 
but only cows are considered sacred by Hindu, not water buffalo. In 
fact, water buffalo meat is the only cheap source of protein for the 
poor, as goat meat is three times more costly. 
It is worth noting the Constituent Assembly debates regarding 
the inclusion of the cow slaughter ban in the Constitution of India. 
Some members wanted a complete constitutional ban, while others 
favored only a partial prohibition.157 The case for a complete ban was 
 
   153.   Rohit Parihar, Alwar Lynching Case: Cops Drop Charges Against 6 Accused Named 
by Pehlu Khan, INDIATODAY, (Sept. 15, 2017), http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/pehlu-
khan-lynching-case-alwar-rajasthan-police-cid-cattle-cow-vigilantes/1/1048327.html/. 
   154.  Shreya Sinha, Police Are Protecting the Murderers of Pehlu Khan: Fact-finding 
Committee Report, ONEINDIA (Oct. 27, 2017, 18:19 IST), https://www.oneindia.com/
india/police-are-protecting-the-murderers-of-pehlu-khan-fact-finding-committee-report-2570
763.html/. 
 155.  Prashant Pandey, Meat Trader Lynched Near Ranchi, Van Set On Fire, INDIAN 
EXPRESS (June 30, 2017, 8:22 AM), http://indianexpress.com/article/india/jharkhand-
lynching-meanwhile-a-meat-trader-is-lynched-near-ranchi-4728597/. 
   156.   Special Correspondent, Cow Vigilantes ‘Anti-Social’: Modi Breaks His Silence, 
HINDU (Aug 6, 2016, 23:54 IST), http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/Cow-vigila
ntes-%E2%80%98anti-social%E2%80%99-Modi-breaks-his-silence/article14556739.ece; see also 
Special Correspondent, Modi Warns Cow Vigilantes, Says Killing People in the Name of ‘Gau 
Bhakti’ Cannot Be Accepted, HINDU (June 29, 2017, 13:41 IST) http://www.thehindu.com
/news/national/killing-people-in-the-name-of-gau-bhakti-is-not-acceptable-modi-at-sabarmat
i-ashram/article19172520.ece/; Vikas Pathak, Crack Down on Cow Vigilantes, PM Tells States, 
, HINDU (July 16, 2017, 14:25 IST), http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/crack-
down-on-cow-vigilantes-pm-tells-states/article19289158.ece. 
 157. 7 CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES (Nov. 24, 1948), http://parliamentofindia
.nic.in/ls/debates/vol7p12.htm. In the end, the prohibition on cow slaughter was only 
described in Part IV of the Constitution, as a directive principle. See INDIA CONST. art. 48. As 
such, it is merely supposed to be a guideline for State policy. Other directive principles which 
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initiated by certain Hindu members.158 Muslim leaders Z.H. Lari and 
Syed Muhammad Saadulla also made a forceful case for the inclusion 
of the cow slaughter ban in the fundamental rights chapter of the 
Constitution so that the prohibition could become absolute.159 To 
avoid confusion in the law, they called for the inclusion of the ban on 
cow slaughter in fundamental rights and opposed its inclusion in the 
less equally enforced directive principles.160 Historically as well, 
“many prominent Muslims” actively participated in the cow 
protection movement of 1880 to 1894.161 
In the case challenging the Maharashtra Animal Preservation 
(Amendment) Act, the Bombay High Court had to address legal 
questions regarding cow slaughter, freedom of religion, and the 
economic justification of a slaughter ban on bulls and bullocks. The 
Bombay High Court, in its order of May 6, 2016, struck down 
provisions of the newly enacted Maharashtra law as unconstitutional 
and permitted consumption of beef slaughtered outside the state.162 
It also read the provision to punish the possession of beef by holding 
 
are far more important, such as reducing income inequalities, right to work, distribution of 
national resources to serve the common good, etc., are given no  prominence. 
 158. 10 CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES, supra note 23. 
 159. Z.H. Lari stated, 
My own submission to this House is that it is[ ]better to come forward and 
incorporate a clause in[ ]Fundamental Rights that cow slaughter is henceforth[ 
]prohibited, rather than it being left vague in the Directive[ ]Principles, leaving it 
open to Provincial Governments to[ ]adopt it one way or the other . . . . In the 
interests of good-will in the[ ]country and of cordial relations between the 
different[ ]communities I submit that this is the proper occasion when[ ]the 
majority should express itself clearly and definitely. 
7 CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES, supra note 157. 
 160. See supra text accompanying note 159. Syed Muhammad Sa’adulha stated, 
In my religious book, the Holy Qoran, there[ ]is an injunction to the Muslims 
saying – “La Ikraba fid Din”[] or . . . there ought to be no compulsion in the name 
of religion.[ ]I therefore do not like to use my veto when my Hindu[ ]brethren 
want to place this matter in our Constitution from[ ]the religious point of view. 
Id. He did go on to state that if one were to give economic reasons for the complete ban 
then he would rebut the same. Id. However, ultimately the cow slaughter prohibition was 
not included within the Constitution’s fundamental rights because the whole leather 
industry would have collapsed. Thus the slaughter ban was made part of the non-binding 
directive principles. 
 161. HEIKO KRETSCHMER, SANSKRIT READER I: A READER IN SANSKRIT LITERATURE 
48 (2d ed. 2015). 
 162. Mukhtar, supra note 148, §§ 176, 221. 
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that it should be by “conscious possession” only.163 But it did uphold 
the prohibition against consuming cow meat slaughtered in the state 
of Maharashtra.164 
Decades ago, the Supreme Court held in Quareshi v. Bihar that 
cow slaughter during Bakr-id, a Muslim holiday of feasting, was not 
an essential practice of the Muslim petitioner.165 First, the Supreme 
Court referred to Quranic verses, which provided for prayer and 
sacrifice and also made references, in this regard, to authentic 
Hanafi school text of Heydeya, which discusses the sacrifice of a cow, 
camel, or goat.166 It used the texts to conclude that sacrificing a cow 
on Bakr-id was not an essential Islamic practice because a goat could 
be substituted for a cow.167 One might be tempted to ask why the 
Supreme Court looked at scriptures here, when in Fasi v. 
Superintendent of Police, the Court did not.168  
Second, the Court said there was no affidavit on record to show 
that a Maulvi (a Muslim scholar, also known as Maulana) had stated 
that cow slaughter was an essential religious practice.169 If this were 
the tipping argument, how would the judiciary explain rejecting the 
same argument in Hyde in which Christian clergy demonstrated that 
conversion is explicitly provided in the scriptures?170 There, 
the  Orissa High Court had accepted conversion to be an 
essential  Christian practice but was overturned by the Indian 
Supreme  Court.171 
The Supreme Court needs to look at the constitutional 
conundrum between the directive principle of prohibition on cow 
 
 163. Id. § 222. 
 164. Id. §§ 4, 221. 
 165. Quareshi v. State of Bihar, 1959 SCR 629, 635 (India). 
 166. Id. at 650. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Fasi, supra note 88. The Kerala High Court said, “Counsel for the petitioner was 
not able to point out anything said in the holy Quran requiring the followers of Islam to grow 
a beard.” Id. § 4.  However, the Quran alone is not sufficient to determine essential practices 
of Islam, as the Quran itself says to follow the Prophet Muhammad, and his sayings and doings 
compiled as Sunna are equally important to the Quran. 
 169. Quareshi, 1959 SCT at 651 (“We have, however, no material on the record before 
us which will enable us to say, in the face of the foregoing facts, that the sacrifice of a cow on 
that day is an obligatory overt act for a [Muslim] to exhibit his religious belief and idea.”). 
 170. Hyde, supra note 122, § 4. 
 171. Rev. Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1977 SCR (2) 611 (India). 
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slaughter and the fundamental right to religion. It is the latter that is 
more important and thus ought to prevail—the framers did not place 
the ban on cow slaughter under Part III of the Constitution that 
outlines fundamental rights. The blame cannot be put at the 
doorstep of the minority community, as minority members of the 
Constituent Assembly made a strong case for including a provision in 
the fundamental rights chapter in the interest of “good-will” and 
“cordial relations” and to ensure consistent treatment.172 The nation 
has not had any trouble with limiting the ban to the slaughter of 
cows of a certain age.173 Why, then, has the judiciary changed its 
position to completely prohibit cow slaughter?174 This shift affects 
the leather industry, in terms of lost revenue at the corporate level 
and lost revenue for those employed.175 Additionally, this affects the 
Dalits, Adivasis, Muslims, and Christians—together a sizable portion 
of the Indian population—who rely on beef as their chief source of 
nutrition,176 rather than pulses or vegetables, which are relatively 
more expensive.177 Is this not pure majoritarianism? Does it not 
adversely affect the personal choices of citizens regarding their 
food  habits? 
This judicial support of majoritarianism with respect to religion 
may be seen in the 2004 decision in Om Prakash and Ors. vs. State of 
U.P. and Ors.178 In that case, the Court upheld the prohibition on 
the sale of eggs in the municipal region of Rishikesh, a Hindu 
pilgrim city, on the grounds that the inhabitants and pilgrims would 
 
 172. The exact words used by Z.H. Lari during the Constituent Assembly debate. 7 
CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES, supra note 157. 
 173. Quareshi, 1959 SCT at 676–78. 
 174. State of Gujarat v. Jamat, Civ. App. No. 4937–40 of 1998 (India Oct. 26, 2005). 
 175.  Tommy Wilkes & Mayank Bhardwaj, Cattle Slaughter Crackdown Ripples Through 
India’s Leather Industry, REUTERS (June 14, 2017, 6:53 AM), https://in.reuters.com
/article/uk-india-politics-religion-insight/cattle-slaughter-crackdown-ripples-through-indias-
leather-industry-idINKBN1951QQ/. 
 176. “In India, cattle have always been relished and their meat is a critical source of 
nutrition for various communities—including Adivasis, Dalits, Christians, Muslims and several 
other castes . . . .” Sagari Ramdas, Bovine Politics, 677 SEMINAR 41, 44 (2016). 
 177. Shoaib Daniyal, Between Banned Beef and Expensive Dal, How Are Poor Indians 
Supposed to Get Enough Protein?, SCROLL.IN (Oct. 31, 2015, 9:15 AM), http://scroll.in
/article/765001/between-banned-beef-and-expensive-dal-how-are-poor-indians-supposed-to-
get-enough-protein. 
 178. Om Prakash and Ors. vs. State of U.P. and Ors., AIR 2004 SC 202 (India). 
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prefer a “clean” vegetarian atmosphere in the city.179 This ruling does 
nothing but impose majoritarian views on the other communities 
living within the city. 
On August 24, 2017, in a big blow to federal  government, a 
nine-judge bench of the Supreme Court held the right to privacy as a 
fundamental right and said that what one eats is a matter of personal 
autonomy and what religion one follows is a question of choice. 
Justice Chamleswara made the following observation in the 
judgment: “I do not think that anybody would like to be told by the 
State as to what they should eat or how they should dress or whom 
they should be associated with either in their personal, social or 
political life.” The judgment will have a far reaching impact on the 
beef ban laws.180 
Freedom of religion impacts social stability. The Om Prakash case 
and recent controversies demonstrate that all is not well with the 
freedom of religion in India. There is an urgent need for the new 
government to assure religious minorities that the constitutional 
guarantees and promises made during the drafting of the Indian 
Constitution will be fully honored. Moreover, the innovation of the 
doctrine of essentiality restricts the freedom of religion of the 
majority and gives a role to the judiciary that it is ill-equipped to 
undertake. India has frequently had communal rights, and the best 
way to create an environment of trust between diverse religious 
communities is to ensure the fullest protection of their freedom 
of  religion. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Religion and spirituality have been central to Indian society, but 
religion has been—and ought to be—an inward association.181 The 
Indian Constitution was framed with this in mind; the State was not 
to interfere, but the scope for reform was left within the text itself.182 
The doctrine of essentiality propounded by the Indian Supreme 
Court impinges on individual freedom and gives too much power to 
 
  179. Id. at 9. 
   180. Justice KS Puttuswami v. Union of India, 2017 SCALE 1, 181 (India). 
 181. See Raju, supra note 14, at 1, 31–32; GANDHI, THE COLLECTED WORKS, supra 
note 24, at 74–75. 
 182. See INDIA CONST. art. 25; JACOBSOHN, supra note 21, at 286. 
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the courts in matters of religion. In effect, it elevates the judiciary to 
the status of clergy. Moreover, politicians have also curtailed 
individual choice in several ways, the latest instance being causing 
the national identity card (Aadhar) to be linked with income tax 
payment183 The original idea was to shape a society of peace and 
harmony, with religion’s role well recognized by the framers of the 
Indian Constitution.184 However, in India, religion can and has been 
used to create fragmentation.185 
In India, the constitutional position on secularism was adopted 
to assure minorities that their culture, religion, and identity would 
be protected and that majoritarian views would not be imposed on 
them.186 This was done to manage tension between religious 
groups,187 by placing them on equal footing vis-à-vis the State188 and 
by distancing the State from any specific religious affiliation.189 
Alongside balancing diversity, the Indian Constitution also sought to 
create a progressive society based on “scientific temper.”190 The 
Supreme Court has said that the State could intervene under specific 
circumstances to regulate secular activities associated with religious 
practice, but not the regulation of “religious practices as such.”191 
The idea of limited intervention brought the judiciary into the 
equation. Over the years, the judiciary has styled itself as the messiah 
(messenger or reformer) by taking upon itself responsibility to 
cleanse superstition from religion and reform it to suit ideas of 
modern rationality.192 The Court’s insistence on following the 
essentiality test (instead of following the American approach of 
taking asserted religious beliefs at face value) has struck at the very 
 
 183. See Faizan Mustafa, Supreme Court as Clergy, TRIBUNE, (May 20, 2017, 12:28 IST) 
http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/supreme-court-as-clergy/409651.html. 
 184. See supra text accompanying note 50; KÜNG, supra note 27, at xxiii; Gopin, supra 
note 35, at 1; Joshi & Kumari, supra note 43, at 40–50. 
 185. See U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 46, at 149–53. 
 186. See INDIA CONST. arts. 29, 30; Chandhoke, supra note 55, at 296–97; supra text 
accompanying note 66. 
 187. See Chandhoke, supra note 55, at 291–95. 
 188. See id. 
 189. See Taylor, supra note 58, at 31–53. 
 190. See INDIA CONST. art. 51A, cl. h. 
 191. See Gandhi v. State of Bombay, 1954 SCR 1035, 1063 (India); supra text 
accompanying note 71. 
 192. Mustafa, supra note 8. 
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foundation of religious freedom in India.193 Practices of Hinduism 
and its denominations have been targeted by reformist judges who 
consider the practices to be based on superstition,194 while practices 
central to Islam are targeted either because of the sentiments of the 
majority community or the misplaced understanding of Islamic 
practices.195 The whole concept of providing constitutional 
protection only to those elements of a religion that the Court 
considers essential is problematic for three reasons. 
First, it assumes that there can be objective criteria for deciding 
what is essential to a religion and what is not. This is a fundamentally 
wrong assumption, as the very idea of religion is subjective. As 
observed in 1943 by the Australian High Court in Adelaide Co. of 
Jehovah Witnesses v. Commonwealth: “What is religion to one is 
superstition to another.”196 Secondly, such an approach assumes that 
one element or practice of religion is independent of the others. This 
approach assumes that some things are central to religion and others 
are merely incidental. This cannot be correct—it is the summation of 
various elements and practices that together constitute a religion. 
Finally, this approach assumes that religions are static and that what 
was central a few centuries ago must continue to hold true today. 
Religions, like all else, must be allowed to change and evolve 
with  time. 
“The essentiality test has proved to be the biggest deterrent to 
freedom of religion in India.”197 It was invented by the Indian 
Supreme Court without any constitutional basis. The Indian 
 
 193. See Shirur Mutt, supra note 72, at 1021–25 (discussing the meaning of management 
of “affairs in matters of religion” and the definition of religion); Dhavan, supra note 75 
(discussing the Court’s implied rejection of the “assertion test” and adoption of a test that 
requires that a practice or set of beliefs must be essential to that religion in order to be 
afforded constitutional protection); Mustafa, supra note 8; supra text accompanying note 78; 
supra text accompanying note 74. 
 194. See Gram Sabha, supra note 84, at 17 (holding that the capture for worship and 
performance of cobras is not an essential part of the Hindu religion and therefore violates a 
statute that prohibits the capturing of Indian Cobras); Quareshi v. State of Bihar, 1959 SCR 
629, 651 (India); Ramesh Sharma, supra note 87, § 30; supra text accompanying note 87; 
supra text accompanying note 90. 
 195. See Faruqui, supra note 95; Fasi, supra note 88, §4; Anandan, supra note 88; see also 
Mustafa supra note 183. 
 196. Adelaide Co. of Jehovah’s Witnesses Inc. v. Commonwealth (1943) 67 CLR 116, 
123 (Austl.). 
 197. Mustafa, supra note 81. 
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Supreme Court should reconsider its reliance on this test. This is not 
to say that there should be no social reform; the State is not 
powerless in this regard.198 The State has been given power to 
regulate religions in the name of public order, health, morality, and 
other fundamental rights. Thus, it can take up any secular, economic, 
or political activity associated with religion.199 It has adequate powers 
under Article 25 to initiate social welfare and reforms without 
interpreting religions in terms of essential or non-essential features 
and practices. 
In sum, the essentiality test has, by stifling the freedom of 
religion in India, created anxiety in minority communities. This, in 
turn, fosters instability in the larger Indian society. It is heartening to 
note that, in its latest pronouncement on August 22nd, 2017, a 
constitutional bench of the Supreme Court held that freedom of 
religion subject to restrictions is absolute. This judgment is indeed 
the high-water mark of freedom of religion in India.200  The Chief 
Justice explicitly held that ‘personal law’ has constitutional 
protection. This protection is extended to ‘personal law’ through 
Article 25 of the Constitution.  It needs to be kept in mind, that the 
stature of personal law is that of a fundamental right. Justice Kurian 
went a step ahead and said that subject to restrictions, the freedom 
of religion under the Constitution of India is absolute on 
this  point.201 
 
  
 
 198. INDIA CONST. art. 25, § 1, reads, “Subject to public order, morality and health and 
to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience 
and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion.” 
 199. INDIA CONST. art. 25, § 2, cl. a, states, “Nothing in this article shall affect the 
operation of any existing law or prevent the State from making any law . . . regulating or 
restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity which may be associated 
with religious practice . . . .” 
 200.  Shayra Bano v. Union of India, 2017 SCALE 1, 178 (India). Chief Justice Khehar 
said so explicitly on his own behalf and on behalf of Justice Nazeer. Id. at 311. Justice Joseph 
in his separate opinion agreed with him on this point. Id. at 360. Thus three out of five judges 
who constitute a majority have held freedom of religion as absolute. See also Faizan Mustafa, 3 
Judgments, 3 Takeaways, INDIAN EXPRESS (Aug. 23, 2017, 12:52 AM), http://indianexp
ress.com/article/explained/3-judgments-3-takeaways-triple-talaq-4809039/; Faizan Mustafa, 
No Instant Solution Yet, TRIBUNE (August 31, 2017, 2:22 IST), http://www.tribune
india.com/news/comment/no-instant-solution-yet/459700.html. 
 201 .  Shayra Bano, 2017 SCALE at 297. 
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